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PREFACE

Roger H. Brown in The Republic in Peril:

1812 has

suggested that causation of the War of 1812 must be
examined on two levels in order to achieve a complete
explanation for the United States' entry into that controversial conflict)

Brown argued that national politicians

responded to public unrest over the actions of England and
France rather than to the actual problems arising between
the United States and the belligerents.

The problems were

the concerns of the people, while the unrest was the
concern of the politicians.

Because the Republicans feared

a resurgence of the Federalist party on the national level,
they attempted to alleviate the growing dissatisfaction
upon which the Federalists might capitalize in the elections
of 1812.

Thus, the decision for war was made by Republican

politicians on the national level in order to maintain the
supremacy of the Republican party, which they equated with
the maintenance of a republican form of government in the
nation.

Seen in this light, the decision was not a selfish

decision made by a party, but rather a carefully considered

1 Roger H. Brown, The Republic in Peril:
York. 1964).
iii

1812 (New

iv
decision designed with the best interest (in Republican
2
eyes) of the nation in mind.
Brown found that the primary concern of the men in
Congress and in the administration, was not over the crisis
itself but rather over the ways in which the crisis
affected the people and thus the nation's political
situation.

In Brown's study, therefore the local response

to the crisis is far more important than the causes for
this response.
The purpose of this study is to examine the causes of
belligerency in Kentucky in this period of diplomatic
crisis, thus examining the second level of causation for
the war as suggested by Brown's study.

The test case used

is Kentucky which was known as one of the states most
anxious for war against Britain, both in Congress and in
the state itself.

However, this study will not attempt to

interpret the role of the state's representatives in the
Congress of the United States, since, if Brown is correct
in his interpretation, the causes of public belligerency

2Bitterness was very intense in this period between
the two parties. The differences were not thought to be
merely over petty political questions, but were conceived
to be differences over the form of government that the
country should have. To the Federalists the Republicans
seemed to be the same type of people who convulsed France
in the French Revolution, and Republican victory meant
revolution and, worst of all, democracy. The Republicans.
on the other hand, saw the Federalists as monarchists who
would use any means available, after winning the election,
to end freedom and liberty in the United States.

had little to do with the final declaration of war.

When a

member of Congress is quoted, it is because his statements
summarize the feeling of the people in Kentucky.

Thus

there is little attempt to relate the voting or speeches of
various representatives to the causes of belligerent attitudes of Kentuckians, except in ways in which these
prominent Kentuckians reflect the backgrounds and attitudes
of their less articulate neighbors.

The role of the

Kentucky Congressmen of the Twelfth Congress in bringing
war, a role which has been extensively studied in many other
works, thus falls outside the scope of this study.
In such a study as this, the researcher is indebted to
many people to such an extent that simple thanks is small
recompense for their troubles and efforts.

I would like to

thank Drs. Lowell H. Harrison and J. Crawford Crowe of
Western Kentucky University who supervised the writing of
this thesis; Ms. Julia Neal and the staff of the Kentucky
Library at Western Kentucky; Ms. Martha Clark and the staff
of the Margie Helms-Cravens Library at Western Kentucky;
James Bentley and the staff of The Filson Club in
Louisville; the staffs of the Louisville Free Public
Library, the University of Louisville Libraries, the
University of Kentucky Library, the University of Tennessee
Library. the Kentucky State Library, the Kentucky State
Historical Society, and the Circuit Court Law Library in

vi
Frankfort.

Kind assistance was also offered by the staff

of the Kentucky State archives in Frankfort.
Appreciation is also expressed to Dr. Jonathan Utley
of the University of Tennessee whose class in United States
diplomatic history allowed me to express my views and
defend them against the criticisms of the class, and by
doing this clarify those ideas in my mind.
Thanks is also due to my wife who typed the first
draft of the thesis and gave assistance of a nature that
only she could provide.
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CHAPTER I

INDIANS, SPAIN AND PROSPERITY

In the first years of the nineteenth century most of
the citizens of the Ohio Valley were pro-French and antiBritish.

The roots of these attitudes went back several

years to the American Revolution when France under Louis
XVI played a large role in the winning of American independence.

This combined with the Jeffersonians' initial

philosophical sympathy for the aims of the French
Revolution to influence western attitudes toward the French
Republic and the Napoleonic reign.

On the other hand.

Kentuckians had never Quite forgiven the British for using
the savage redman against the fledgling settlements of the
Bluegrass.

Stories of Indian depredations were still

discussed throughout the state, and Colonel Henry Hamilton,
the "Hair-buyer," the British official accused of inciting
the Indians against the settlements,
memory to many Kentuckians.

WAS

an all too real

Tennessee Senator Felix

Grundy's story of his early life in Kentucky. which
reflected the western fear and hatred of the Indians. was
recounted before the Senate.
be unique.

His story would not seem to

Grundy stated that

I was too young to participate in these
1

2
[earliest] dangers and difficulties, but I can
remember when death was in almost every bush, and
every thicket concealed an ambuscade.
If I am
asked to trace my memory back and name the first
indelible impression it received, it would be the
sight of my eldest brother bleeding and dying
under the wounds inflicted by the tomahawk and
scalping knife. Another and another went the
same way! I have seen a widowed mother plundered
of her whole property in a single night. . . .
Sir, the ancient sufferings of the West were
great.1
Memories such as these were long in disappearing.
The British compounded this distrust and hatred in the
1790's with their holding of the Northwestern forts lying on
American soil, from which they were accused of inciting the
Indians.

Further distrust was created by the American fear

that England would try to regain her former colonies at any
cost.

Although this fear may have been ungrounded, it

certainly created much disturbance in the West.2
In the first years of the last decade of the eighteenth
century, the Northwest territories were being opened to
American settlers, which led to the inevitable clash between
3
the frontier farmers and the Indian hunters.

In order to

'Quoted in Christopher B. Coleman, "The Ohio Valley
in the Preliminaries of the War of 1812," The Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, VII (June 1920), 43.
2Robert B. McAfee, History of the Late War in the
Western Country (Ann Arbor, 1966; originally published
Lexington, 1816), 1.
3
Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic; The
United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (New York,
1969), 18.

3
secure lands for these new settlers, and to stop the Indian
raids into Kentucky, the United States government sent three
expeditions into the Northwest to deal with the savages.
The first of these expeditions was led by General Henry
Harmar who was defeated late in 1790 in the Ohio territory
in his effort to stop the Indian raids at their source.4
Heartened by their victory, the Indians resumed their
5
raids with increased hostility.

To alleviate this problem,

General Arthur St. Clair, another regular army officer, led
an expedition into the territory north of the Ohio River in
late 1792, to disperse the Indians living there.

St. Clair

was not capable at his advanced age of leading a successful
attack against the Indians.

Camping on the banks of the

upper Wabash River in the Ohio territory. St. Clair, his
ranks depleted by desertion, failed to build a strong
defensive line, and delayed this chore until the next day.
Because of this error, when an Indian attack came
shortly before dawn St. Clair's men were driven back and
soundly defeated.

Retreating back to Fort Washington (on

the present site of Cincinnati), the regulars and militia
under the general left approximately six hundred men either

4Ibid., 20-21: McAfee. War in the Western Country.
2; Thomas D. Clark. A History of Kentucky (Lexington,
1960). 97.
5Prucha. Sword of the Republic. 22.

4
killed or captured.6

Harmar and St. Clair knew almost

nothing of Indian warfare, and their failures made
Kentuckians reluctant to serve against the Indians in
further expeditions led by regular army officers.7

The

inability of the government to deal effectively with the
Indians and their white allies was "alarming . . . to
Kentucky."

Many Kentuckians blamed the failure of these

expeditions upon poor management by the generals involved,
but placed the blame for the savage warfare upon the
British.8
For the next campaign into the western territories,
President George Washington chose General "Mad" Anthony
Wayne.

Wayne, taking more time to prepare than his

predecessors, made extensive use of spies and scouts and in
June, 1794, with the aid of General Charles Scott and 1,600
mounted Kentucky militiamen, marched into Indian territory
where he routed the Indians at the Battle of Fallen
Timbers.9

The battle ended the Indian problem in Kentucky

for some time and led to the Treaty of Greenville which
further opened the Northwest territories to settlement.1°

6Ibid., 25-26; Clark, History of Kentucky, 98-99.
7
Clark, History of Kentucky, 99.
8Samuel McDowell to Andrew Reid, December 8, 1971,
Papers of Samuel McDowell (The Filson Club, Louisville,
Kentucky).
9Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 36-37.
10Clark, History of Kentucky, 99-100.

5
All of these Indian raids were blamed upon the British
and their efforts of arming and advising the savages.

The

Americans accused the British (from their positions in the
Northwest territories rightfully belonging to the United
States) of stirring the Indians into violence.11

Robert B.

McAfee, chronicler of the War of 1812, saw further evidence
of British intervention in what Americans insisted was a
purely domestic affair.

He charged the British commander

of Detroit with directly encouraging the Indians in the
Battle of Fallen Timbers from a recently built fort near
the site of the battle.

In addition to encouragement and

supplies, many British-Canadians were accused of fighting
beside their Indian allies.

McAfee felt the period of

peace following the Battle of Fallen Timbers resulted from
the realization by the Indians that the British could not
effectively defend them.12
Kentuckians felt that without the aid of the British
the frontier farmers could easily oust the Indians from the
desired lands)-3

The idea that this ousting might not be

Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
"
American People (4th ed., New York, 1950), 59.
12McAfee, War in the Western Country. 4-6.
13
Robert McNutt McElroy. Kentucky in the Nation's
History (New York, 1909). 193-95. Surprisingly. the
Kentuckians were opposed to the Jay Treaty when it was
first made public. This attitude changed, however, when
the British troops were withdrawn from the Northwestern
forts.

6
just was not considered by the settlers who saw the Indian
as a barrier to what the westerners thought was justly
theirs.

In the mind of the frontiersmen, God had given the

white man the lands west of the mountains for their own use
and increase; the Indians were just so much vermin to be
exterminated or driven away.

14

Although Fallen Timbers

brought peace to the frontiers of Kentucky, the settlers
still believed that the British were active in inciting the
Indians and keeping them hostile to the citizens of the
West.

15

Thus the memories of the previous Anglo-Indian
alliances and the fear of future cooperation between the
wily and ruthless Indians and their British allies envoked
both aversion and anxiety in the minds of the westerners.
In 1803, when European war recommenced, this attitude
brought an anti-British bias, which was shown in countless
war reports in Kentucky newspapers citing the tyranny of

England.

16

14
Co1eman, "Ohio Valley Preliminaries War of 1812,"
43; Louis M. Hacker, "Western Land Hunger and the War of
1812; A Conjecture," The Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, X (March 1924). 372; Vance Armentrout, "Kentuckians
Only SeemedDifferent." The Filson Club History Quarterly,
XXVIII (April 1954). 125.
15
McAfee. War in the Western Country, 7.
16
Most battle reports printed in Kentucky newspapers
tended to be pro-French. An example of the criticism of
the British can be found in The Danville Informant. April
3. 1806. and other newspapers.

7
Although the Kentuckians generally were pro-French,
they were not ready to aid Napoleon in his struggle against
the British.

Kentuckians were determined to enjoy the

prosperity promised by the opening of the Northwest
territories following the Jay Treaty and the Treaty of
Greenville and the prosperity brought about by their
neutrality in the European struggle.

17

The periodic

opening of the Mississippi to American commerce increased
this prosperity

and made the westerners reluctant to

meddle in foreign affairs.

Only in 1802 when this pros-

perity was threatened did the Kentuckians express more than
casual interest in foreign relations.
As holder of the mouth of the Mississippi, Spain could
regulate all western commerce exported through this vital
natural waterway.

Since the costs of transporting produce

across the mountains was prohibitive, the western river
system provided the only practical method of getting
frontier goods to market.

As early as the Jay-Gardoqui

Treaty, the West had expressed vigorous concern regarding
the rights of navigation and deposit claimed through the
18
Far from accepting this
Anglo-American Treaty of 1783.
claim, the Spanish refused throughout the first twenty
years of American independence to allow these rights to the

17

McAfee, War in the Western Country, 7.

18
Bailey. Diplomatic History, 48.

8
citizens of the United States on a permanent basis.
Through the efforts of William Pinckney, the United States
did obtain the right of deposit at New Orleans, but this
right, in practicality, remained under the control of
Spain.19
On October 16, 1802, after several years of free use
of the river, Kentuckians found the port of New Orleans
closed to their commerce.

20

This could prove to be ruinous

to the farmers of the Ohio Valley who depended upon the
exportation of their surplus to show a profit.

21

Kentucky

had exported $1,182,804 worth of goods through New Orleans
in 1802 and with the removal of the right of deposit, this
22
might be reduced to a trickle.

Although the Kentuckians

were dismayed with the closing of the river, they
suppressed their initial response and waited for the national
government to effect a solution through diplomatic
23
channels.

19A complete narrative of Pinckney's Treaty can be
found in Samuel Flagg Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty; America's
Advantage from Europe's Distress, 1783-1800 (New Haven,
1960; originally published, 1926).
20
Bailey, Diplomatic History, 95.
21

Clark, History of Kentucky, 114-15.

22
Lowell H. Harrison, John Breckinridge; Jeffersonian
Republican (Louisville, 1969), 149.
23
Ibid.; Bailey, Diplomatic History, 95-96.

9
Meeting in December, 1802, the Kentucky General
Assembly drew up a resolution stating that they pledged
with their "lives and fortunes such measures as the honor
24
or interest of the United States may require."

Such was

the faith in the Jefferson administration, that as important
an

issue as the use of the Mississippi River could be left

completely in his hands.

Although the General Assembly was

willing to put complete trust in Jefferson, some citizens
of the state expressed more violent sentiments.

William

Bradford and William Stevenson expressed assurances that
troops could be raised in sufficient numbers to open the
port and Charles Smith wrote Senator John Breckinridge that
the port of New Orleans must be opened or Kentuckians would
25
Some citizens of the Commonwealth
take direct action.
went so far as to organize a volunteer army for an assault
26
upon New Orleans.
On Friday, December 24, 1803, Breckinridge presented
the resolution of the Kentucky General Assembly to the
Senate.27

Breckinridge agreed with the temper of the

resolution and was completely willing to allow the

24
Lexington Kentucky Gazette, December 7, 1802.
25
Harrison, Breckinridge, 149.
26
Kentucky Gazette. March 29, 1803.
27
The Debates and Proceedings in the Congresses of the
United States, 7 Cong., 2 Sess., 17 (Dec. 24, 1802). This
source will hereafter be referred to as Annals of Congress.

10
President a free hand in the handling of the situation.

28

Jefferson showed that he was aware of the situation in the
West when he sent the name of James Monroe to the Senate to
be confirmed as a special envoy to join Robert Livingston
who had been negotiating with France concerning the
purchase of New Orleans.

Although Monroe was given no more

power than Livingston, Jefferson

thought

that the West

would have more confidence in his actions and that his
appointment would help alleviate some of the discontent in
29
the western areas.
The Federalists in the West hoped to use this
diplomatic situation to increase their power in their home
30
territories.

James Ross of Pittsburgh, the only western

Senator from the minority party, brought the question of
the closing of the river before the Senate on February 14,
1803.

He called for Congress to authorize the raising of

troops, and for the President to seize such points as would
allow the United States free navigation of the river.31
This touched off much discussion in the Senate for and
against the Ross resolution.

Rising on February 23, 1803,

28
Harrison, Breckinridge, 150.
29Bailey,
Diplomatic History, 97.
30
Ibid., 95.
31Annals of Congress, 7 Cong., 2 Sess., 83-89 (Feb.
14, 1803).

11
Breckinridge presented his case concerning the controversy.
Denying that the state of Kentucky would reject the pacific
actions of the President, Breckinridge asserted that they
were willing to wait until the negotiations were given a
chance to succeed.

Then, thought Breckinridge, if the

negotiations should fail, the United States should be ready
to take more militant action.

In accordance with this

sentiment, Breckinridge presented a series of resolutions
that would put the decision concerning offensive action in
the hands of the President.
Breckinridge's proposals stated that:
Resolved, That the President of the United States
be, and he is hereby authorized, whenever he
shall judge it expedient, to require of the
Executives of the several States to take effectual measures to organize, arm and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness to march at a
moment's warning eighty thousand effective
militia, officers included.
Resolved, That the President may, if he judges it
expedient, authorize the Executives of the several
States to accept, as part of the detachment
aforesaid, any corps of volunteers; who shall
continue in service for such time, not exceeding
months, and perform such services as
shall be prescribed by law.
dollars be approResolved, That
priated for paying and subsisting such part of the
troops aforesaid, whose actual service may be
wanted, and for defraying such other expenses as.
during the recess of Congress, the President may
deem necessary for the security of the territory
of the United States.
Resolved. That
priated for erecting,

dollars be approat such place or places on

12
the western waters, as the PresidenI may judge
most proper, one or more arsenals.34
Breckinridge's proposal stirred new debate, and when a
vote was finally taken on February 25, 1803. the Ross
resolutions were defeated 15 to 11, with the balloting
strictly along party lines.

When Breckinridge's proposal

33
was presented in its place, it passed 25 to O.
Breckinridge prevented the Federalists from embarrassing
the administration and kept the final decision-making power
concerning the use of force in the control of Jefferson.
As the people of Kentucky waited patiently for news of
the Monroe mission to France, events began to unfold in
Paris.

Napoleon was disheartened by the failure to quell

the revolution on Santo Domingo led by Toussaint
L'Ouverture, and he felt that in the event of renewed war.
Louisiana would be difficult to defend against superior
British naval power.

He may have believed that it was

better to sell the territory to the United States than let
it fall to Britain for nothing.

Therefore, he offered to

34
sell the entire territory to the United States.
When rumors began circulating in Kentucky concerning
the transaction, many people were skeptical, but when the

321bid., 115-19 (Feb. 23, 1803).
"Ibid.. 255 (Feb. 25, 1803); Harrison, Breckinridge.
152.
34
Bailey. Diplomatic History, 98-100.

13
reports were confirmed, great jubilation broke out in all
35
parts of the Commonwealth.

This rejoicing was reflected

by the many public celebrations held across the state.36
It appeared that the Kentuckians had finally achieved their
great goal, the permanent opening of the Mississippi for
the exportation of their crops.
This jubilation soon turned to anger as the Spanish
officials in New Orleans refused to part with the recently
ceded territory.

When news of the Spanish resistance

reached Washington, Jefferson departed from his pacific
position and ordered the raising of western militiamen for
37
the seizing of America's newly acquired prize.
When Kentucky was asked to muster 4,000 troops for the
expedition, the request was favorably received.

General

Samuel Hopkins of Kentucky claimed that the western country
was "all on fire!" as the frontiersmen enthusiastically
38
supported the call to arms.

Business was reported to be

at a standstill due to the enlisting of almost every man in

35Ibid., 102; Clark, History of Kentucky, 115.
3t,
Harrison, Breckinridge, 161; McElroy, Kentucky in
Nation's History, 274.
37
Clark, History of Kentucky, 116.
38
Bailey, Diplomatic History, 105; Robert Breckinridge
McAfee. Journal, 1803-1807, McAfee Papers (The Filson Club),
8, 11, 12.

14
39
the state for service against the Spanish.

The bounty of

150 acres of land to every man joining the expedition may
have induced many to enlist,40 although the general
determination to procure the newly won territory was the
motivating force in many instances.

Whatever their motives,

the troops were very anxious to march against the Spanish,
and their belligerence grew as the expedition was
delayed.41

Whether or not Jefferson was seriously consid-

ering forceful measures or was bluffing, the Spanish,
realizing that resistance would mean war with both the
buyer and seller, responded to this threat.

The Spanish

officials peacefully handed the territory over to the
French who then turned authority over to the United
States

42

The following months were filled in Kentucky with
celebrations of America's recent purchase.

Throughout

April and May of 1804, local celebrations were held around
the state expressing Kentucky's approval of the trans43
action.

Kentuckians had realized from this affair that

their interests were involved with foreign relations, and

39Clark. History of Kentucky, 116; Harrison,
Breckinridge, 166.
40
Harrison, Breckinridge, 166.
41

McAfee, Journal, 1803-1807, 16.

42
Bailey. Diplomatic History, 105-06.
43
Harrison, Breckinridge, 175.

15
that the actions of powers across the seas could affect
their prosperity and well-being.

Thus the first year of

renewed European war passed with little concern expressed
by the people of Kentucky regarding the epic struggle
between the French and English.

Most Kentuckians were far

too concerned with the occurrences nearer to their homes
with the Spanish than with the power struggle on the
continent of Europe.
The opening of the Mississippi River was the beginning
of a period of rapid western expansion.

The river provided

an outlet for the produce of the western country, and the
influx of settlers passing through to the new lands added
44
to the increased wealth of the state. Though there was a
definite anti-British feeling in the West, most citizens of
the state were willing to follow the advice of the
Washington, Kentucky Weekly Messenger to remain neutral in
45
the struggle between the European powers.

Affluence

seemed a permanent reality and most people were concerned
with taking advantage of the increased financial opportunities.

The western farmers truly thought that all barriers

44
George R. Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent in the
Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812," Journal of
Political Economy, XXX (August 1931), 471-72.
45Washington (Ky.) Weekly Messenger. Sept. 15. 1803.

16
to prosperity were removed.

Promise of financial well-

46
being seemed to be fulfilled.
Throughout 1804 and 1805, although the United States
had trouble with Spain along the Southwestern boundary, the
people of Kentucky were not yet openly concerned with
France and Great Britain.

In his annual message to the

legislature of the Commonwealth on November 5, 1805,
Governor Christopher Greenup stated that
. . . we certainly [have] much cause, as well of
self felicitation, as of sincere gratitude to the
ruler of the universe that while they [old world
countries] are immersed abroad; we are in peace.
tranquil and prosperous. . . .47
Prices for staples were high during 1805 and 1806 and
48
appeared destined to remain so.
President Jefferson, although he was not yet prepared
to adopt an aggressive course of action against the Spanish
in regard to the border dispute in the Southwest, sent a
message to Congress on December 3, 1805 which stirred many

46Tay lor, "Agricultural Discontent in the Mississippi
Valley," 471.
47The Journal of the House of Representatives of the
11 (Nov. 5.
Commonwealth of Kentucky . . . 1805 . .
1805). This source will hereafter be referred to as
Journal, Kentucky House with the year of the journal cited.
All journals used were published in Frankfort. Greenup's
speech was read for him; he was reported to have been too
ill to attend. Sentiments similar to Greenup's can be
found in The Kentucky Gazette, Sept. 29. 1806.
48Tay'or. "Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi
Valley." 474.

17
adventurous souls in Kentucky.

Smarting under the insults

of the Spanish, many young men in the Bluegrass were
willing to resort to force if need be to assert America's
49
rights.

Henry Clay believed that a war against the

Spanish would not be unpopular and might serve as a determent to the powers of Europe, showing that the United
States was ready to assert herself if the occasion arose.

50

Although most of the attention of Kentuckians in 1805
and 1806 was on the Spanish problems, the abuses of the
British on the high seas were again becoming noticeable, as
they had been preceding the Jay Treaty.

51

Breckinridge

discouraged war talk in Kentucky and supported Jefferson's
commercial coercion to bring the English government to
terms.52

He was further heartened

by news of the death of

William Pitt whom he saw as the great barrier to accord

49
Harrison, Breckinridge, 194-95. Jefferson's speech
can be found in H. A. Washington (ed.). The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson. . . . (9 vols., Washington, 1854), VIII.
46-57.
50
Henry Clay to John Breckinridge, January 5. 1806,
James F. Hopkins and W. M. Hargraves, eds., Papers of Henry
). I, 216.
Clay (4 vols. to date, Lexington, 1959Referred to hereafter as Clay Papers.
51Harrison, Breckinridge, 195.
52John Breckinridge to Henry Clay, March 19. 1806,
Hopkins and Hargraves, eds., Clay Papers, I, 228. A nonimportation law was passed in April, 1806. but did not go
into effect until December, 1807. following the ChesapeakeLeopard affair. A full discussion of this act can be found
in Herbert Heaton. "Non-Importation. 1806-1812." Journal of
Economic History. I (November 1941). 178-98.

18
53
between the United States and Britain.

Although an

agreement did not materialize in 1806, most Americans,
Kentuckians included, mistakenly believed that such a
settlement was near.

54

Shortly, after the furor over a possible Spanish war
subsided, Kentuckians were subjected to renewed rumors
concerning the Spanish intrigues of the 1790's, when many
prominent Kentuckians were accused of conspiring with the
55
officials at New Orleans.

As early as January 10, 1806.

United States District Attorney Joseph Hamilton Daviess had
warned Jefferson of a new conspiracy in the western country
56
concerning the recently purchased Louisiana territory.
With the coming of fall the Frankfort Western World, under
the influence of Federalist Humphrey Marshall, former
Senator from Kentucky, joined with Daviess in a violent
attack upon former Vice-President Aaron Burr as the leader
57
of the latter conspiracy.

Accused of plotting disunion,

53John Breckinridge to Henry Clay, March 22, 1806,
Clay Papers, I, 228.
54
A treaty negotiated by Monroe and William Pinckney
was rejected by Jefferson because of its failure to deal
effectively with the problem of impressment. Samuel Flagg
Bemis. A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York,
1965). 146-47.
55Harrison, Breckinridge, 197.
56Thomas Perkins Abernethy. The Burr Conspiracy (New
York, 1954), 90.
57

Ibid.. 92-94.

19
Burr was betrayed by fellow conspirator General James
Wilkinson, the arch intriguer of the West, and tried in a
federal court presided over by Chief Justice John Marshall.
Much to the displeasure of Jefferson, Burr's case was
dismissed for lack of evidence.

58

Through the fall and winter of 1806-1807, these
events captured the attention of most Kentuckians, outshining the various orders and decrees of the European
powers.

As spring turned to summer on the western waters,

Kentuckians were still discussing Burr's treason and the
possible guilt of his accused Kentucky accomplices.

When

the Burr trial began in August, 1807, Kentuckians turned
their primary attention to that affair, an event which
temporarily outshown the problems arising from the
Chesapeake affair.59

In Kentucky, the tyranny of England

and France were of less importance than the exciting Burr
Conspiracy.
Throughout the first three years of renewed European
war, Kentuckians had been concerned to some extent with
foreign affairs, but the struggle between France and
England had taken a secondary importance behind the more
immediate problems with Spain.

Occupying far more time

58Ibid., 246-49.
59

Interest was so great in the state that The Kentucky
Gazette reprinted a full account of the trial running from
September through December, 1807. relegating the AngloAmerican problems to a lesser position.
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were purely domestic concerns, the growing prosperity of
the Ohio Valley, and in late 1806 the news of the Burr
Conspiracy.

All this would change very quickly in 1807,

but until that time most citizens of Yentucky concurred
with Governor Greenup that
Happy with us, the lapse of a year is marked only
by the roll of seasons, and the resulting avocation of man--Instead of mingling condolence in
the ravages of war, or deploring the convulsions
of intrigue or faction, we have to falicitate
ourselves, and we ought to feel a gratitude to
the ruler of events, that the government of
America has yet been permitted to escape the
worse of evils--that she enjoys peace, and that
all is tranquil. . . .60
Events of 1807 would threaten this tranquility and plunge
the United States to the brink of war with Great Britain.

60Journal, Kentucky House, 1806, 16
(Nov. 5, 1806).

CHAPTER II

THE CHESAPEAKE AFFAIR AND THE EMBARGO
While Kentuckians had been preoccupied in 1805 and
1806 with local and sectional problems, the coastal states
were confronted with an issue which arose from Great
Britain's need for seamen.

England had been forced to

resort to the impressment of her citizens to fill the crews
of the fleets protecting her coasts because conditions
aboard her navy were so harsh that few Englishmen volun'Press gangs roamed the port cities of
teered for service.
England and searched neutral merchant ships to procure
Englishmen to man her war ships.

One of the leading havens

for Englishmen hoping to escape the Royal Navy was the
greatly enlarged American merchant marine, which was in
need of men.

Since the Americans were making large profits

and were undercrewed, the wages on American ships were
quite high, which served as added inducement to English
2
During the
sailors to desert their British employers.
period between 1803 and 1812, an estimated 20,000 sailors

1Bailey, Diplomatic History. 111; Bemis. Diplomatic
History, 114.
2Bailey, Diplomatic History, 112-13; Bemis, Diplomatic
History, 144.
21
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left His Majesty's service to seek refuge on American
3
ships.
In order to secure the return of these deserters, the
British navy abused its rights as a belligerent to stop and
search neutral shipping.

Patrolling just outside American

waters and using American ports to refit and resupply, the
British began seizing sailors aboard American merchant
ships to fill vacancies on their war ships.

Any hint of

British origin was justification to the British to return a
"deserter" to the service of the "country of his birth."

A

cockney accent or any other characteristic of English birth
was the usual criteria for judgment, but in times of
emergency, or when there were no obvious British types
aboard, the criteria wererelaxed.4

Many native Americans

were taken from their ships and forced to serve aboard
British war ships opposing the French.

An estimated

90% of

the 10,000 men impressed from American vessels in the decade
5
between 1803 and 1812 were United States citizens.
To make matters more complicated and less just, the
British placed the burden of proof to gain the release of
the illegally impressed seamen upon the United States
government, a procedure which required months or even years

3Bemis, Diplomatic History, 145.
4Bailey, Diplomatic History. 112.
5Bernard Mayo. Henry Clay:
(Cambridge, 1937), 281.

Spokesman of the New Nest
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6
to complete.

To eliminate the chance of the British

mistaking an American citizen for British, the American
government issued papers to native-born seamen, assuring
all concerned that the bearer was a citizen of the United
States.

This however was scoffed at by the British and

completely disregarded.

American sailors were eager to

sell these protection papers to their British shipmates,
and the papers became all but meaningless since nearly all
deserters could raise the $10 purchase price usually asked
7
by American sailors for the documents.

Since the United

States was a country of immigrants, it held that naturalization was legal.

On the contrary, the British contended

that British nationality could never be given up: "Once an
Englishman, always an Englishman" was the phrase that
summed up their position.

The concept that a Britisher

could avoid service to his country by changing his
nationality was completely rejected by the English.8

The

failure by either side to compromise with the other on this
issue led to increased friction between the two countries.
The practice of reclaiming "deserters" by impressment
was triply inconvenient to the Americans, even when the
impressed sailor was a British subject.

When the need for

6
Bailey. Diplomatic History, 111; Bemis, Diplomatic
History, 145.
7
Bemis. Diplomatic History, 145.
8Ibid.. 144: Bailey, Diplomatic History. 113.

24
sailors was great. British impressments often left American
ships undercrewed, which led in several cases to the
sinking of those ships.

Secondly, the searching of a ship

would require such a long period of time that the affected
ship might miss winds or markets, and consequently lose
much of the value of her cargo.

Finally, the practice of

impressment placed a great hardship upon the families of
those taken.

Often wives and children, mothers and

fathers, would be left destitute when a sailor was impressed,
a situation which created much

among the people of

New England and the middle states.
Clearly, impressment was an insult to the American
nation which seemed unable to protect the crews sailing
under her flag.

To the Americans, the merchant marine was

an extention of American territory and any attempt to
impress a man from an American ship was viewed as being
equivalent to kidnapping a citizen from the streets of
9
Boston, Norfolk or Frankfort, Kentucky.

Clearly, this

illegal practice had to be discontinued, and from 1804 to
1807 the Jefferson administration made several attempts to
alleviate the problem, but with a total lack of success.
Despite the burning anger of the Eastern states, the
problem of impressment before 1807 was of little concern to
the citizens of Kentucky.

Citizens of the Bluegrass were

9
Bailey, Diplomatic History, 111.
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too occupied with Spanish problems, prosperity and the Burr
Conspiracy to give much attention to the abuses of Great
Britain.10

This changed in 1807, and the Kentuckians would

then lead the advocates of war who were determined to halt
England's high-handed actions upon the open seas.

The

incident that brought about this change in attitude was the
Chesapeake-Leopard affair.
In February 1807, several crewmen escaped from a
British squadron lying off the Virginia coast, and four of
the escapees signed for duty aboard the American naval
When word of this action reached

frigate, the Chesapeake.

British Vice-Admiral G. C. Berkeley at Halifax, he became
enraged and ordered that the men be captured and returned
to their rightful fleet.

11

Such action was strictly

Berekley's, as the British government, although it supported
impressment, did not advocate the right to search neutral
war ships.
On June 22, 1807. the Chesapeake, commanded by
Commodore

James Barron, left Chesapeake Bay bound for

Mediterranean duty.

Ten miles off the Virginia coast, the

10Kentucky barely noticed the "Murder of Pierce" when
a stray shot from the British frigate Leander killed the
mate of an American vessel off New York. Reaction in the
coastal areas was intense, but in Kentucky the affair was
not cause for protest.
11
Order of G. C. Berkeley, June 1, 1807, reprinted in
Americanization Department, Veterans of Foreign Wars.
America; Great Crises in Our History Told by Its Makers
(12 vols., Chicago. 1925), V. 78-79.
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Chesapeake was hailed by the British frigate Leopard, which
signalled that it desired to exchange correspondence.
Barron thought that the Leopard wished the American frigate
to carry dispatches to England and therefore allowed
the British warship to approach without ordering the crew
from their quarters or preparing the ship for battle.
Such preparations would have been difficult since the
decks of the Chesapeake were cluttered with gear to be
stored away on the long voyage to the Mediterranean.12

The

Chesapeake was in no position to resist any attack directed
against her.
Drawing near, the British commander presented Admiral
Berkeley's order and asked permission to muster the men of
the Chesapeake to search for British deserters.13

Amazed,

14 whereupon the
Commodore Barron quite properly refused,
British fired three broadsides into the defenseless
15
frigate, killing three Americans and wounding eighteen.
Barron had a live coal brought from the ship's galley and

12Commodore James Barron to Robert Smith (June 1
1807], ibid., 81-82. Smith was Secretary of the Navy at
the time
13
The Captain of HMS Leopard [S. P. Humphreys] to the
Commander of the USS Chesapeake [Barron]. [June 22. 18071,
ibid., 84.
14Barron to the Commander of the Leopard [Humphreys],
[June 22, 1807], ibid.
15As
reported in the Frankfort Palladium of July,
1807, seven or eight men were killed and several others
McElroy, Kentucky in Nation's History, 315.
wounded.
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one gun was fired.16

After this token shot, Barron struck

his colors and allowed the British to board his devastated
ship.

17

The crew was mustered, and four British

"deserters" were taken back to the Leopard to be returned
to the British fleet.

Three of the four men were native

Americans who had served in His Majesty's Navy under
impressment, but the fourth was without doubt an Englishman
and a deserter.

18

This latter seaman was taken to Halifax,

where he was tried, and hanged from the yardarm of his
ship, an event which added further to the humiliation of
the United States.
When the Chesapeake returned to Norfolk. great rage
swelled and engulfed the entire country.

The citizens of

Norfolk rose against the British men-of-war in the harbor,
and forced the British officers on shore leave to flee for
the safety of their vessels.
In response to this affair. President Jefferson
ordered all British warships out of American waters and
made American ports off-limits to the Royal Navy.

A ship,

the Revenge, was sent to England with a demand for an end
of impressment, and Jefferson summoned a special session of
Congress, but carefully set the date far enough in advance

16Robert H.
Ferrell, American Diplomacy (New York,
1969). 141.
17Barron to the Commander of the Leopard (Humphreys),
[June 22, 1807j, America; Great Crimes„ 85.
18ma-, Henry Clay. 313.
yo
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to allow the popular passions to cool.

Jefferson hoped to

use the Chesapeake affair as a wedge to gain the end of
impressment from the British.19
The Chesapeake outrage was annoying in Kentucky,
coming as it did following a period of high expectation of
a United States-Great Britain accord.
greatly indignant."

Kentuckians were

Across the state Kentuckians flocked

to the population centers where they protested the gross
injustice committed by the British.

The anti-English bias

which had smoldered since the Revolution was finally
brought to a flame by the outrageous attack upon the
Chesapeake.21

Kentuckians saw the tyranny of England

19Bailey, Diplomatic History, 116; Mayo, Henry Clay,
313; Ellery L. Hall. "Canadian Annexation Sentiment in
Kentucky Prior to the War of 1812," Register of the
Kentucky Historical Society, XXVIII (Oct. 1930), 373.
20E. Merton Coulter, "Prologue" to G. Glenn Clift,
Remember the Raisin! Kentucky and Kentuckians in the
Battles and Massacre at Frenchtown Michigan Territory, in
War of 1812 (Frankfort, 1961),1. Henry Clay, serving in the
Senate. reported in an open letter in February 1807, that
the problems with Great Britain were not as great as feared
at the beginning of the session. Clay to
February 1, 1807, Hopkins and Hargraves, eds.. Clay Papers,
III, 275. Clay commented several times on the MonroePinckney negotiations which were expected to relieve the
problems between the United States and England. Jefferson
refused to submit the treaty because of its failure to end
. March 10. 1807. ibid.. 288.
impressment. Clay to
21Coulter, "Prologue" to Clift. Remember Raisin, 1:
Lewis Collins, History of Kentucky (Cincinnati, 1847:
reprinted. Lexington. 1968), 296; McElroy, Kentucky
Nation's History, 316. The hatred took the form of revenge
as Kentuckians spoke of taking Canada to settle the
Chesapeake affair. Mayo. Henry Clay. 316.
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entering another phase.

No longer content merely to insult

the United States, England was now attempting to use force
to inflict further humiliation upon the American people.
At Frankfort, a meeting of the citizens of Franklin
County elected Governor Christopher Greenup chairman of the
meeting and proceeded to draft a series of resolutions
denouncing the actions of the British frigate.

The resolu-

tions fell short of calling for a declaration of war
against the British, but the wording could hardly be classified as being passive.

After reviewing the dastardly crime

committed by the British, the meeting resolved that
. . . we have viewed with grief as well as
indignation, for some years past a propensity on
the part of Great Britain to infringe our
national rights.
2d Resolved, nem. con. That in disclaiming all
intention of dictating to our government, we
consider the late unprecedented attack of the
British ship Leopard, on the United States' ship
Chesapeake, as having filled the measure of
national insut and injury.
3d, Resolved, nem. con. That in expressing our
full and entire confidence in the present executive; we rely firmly, on such measures being taken
as will in the future secure our independence and
enforce respect from all European nations.
4th, Resolved, nem. con. That we will support
the constituted authorities of our country in the
measures they shall, in their wisdom deem proper
to take, in vindication of our national honor,
with our lives and our fortunes.
5th, Resolved, nem. con. As our opinion and firm
hope, that if we are to lose our independence;
it shall be lost with swords in our hands.
6th, Resolved, nem. con. That it is the duty
of all who claim or aspire to the high and

30
dignified station of free men, to preserve their
national rights, or to die in the last ditch in
defense of them.
7th, Resolved, nem. con. That we strongly
sympathise in the sentiments expressed, and the
prompt and patriotic measures adopted by the
citizens of Norfolk (Virginia) and its vicinity
on this trying emergency; following from a
laudable indignation at the atrocious outrage
committed on our flag; and dictated by a disinterested regard for the honor and independence
of our common country.
8th, Resolved, nem. con. That this meeting do
approve of their spirit of opposition to the
acts of violence and hostility committed on
American citizens and the flag of the United
States by British subjects, manifested in the
meetings of our Atlantic brethren--and also the
determination of our government shall be known.
The resolutions were then sent to the President and the
22
governors of the various states in the union.

To Robert

B. McAfee, who attended the meeting at Frankfort, war
seemed inevitable.

McAfee stated that the people of

Franklin County were fully united in hatred of Britain. The
call was for vengeance, and all joined in the call for govern23
mental action.

Such meetings were held all across the

state as Kentuckians combined to denounce the attack upon
the warship.

Resolutions were passed at these meetings

22At a meeting of the citizens of Franklin at the State
House in Frankfort, on the 24th of July, 1807, for the
purpose of taking into consideration the depredations,
insults, and outrages committed by British subjects . .
(n.p., n.d.).
23McAfee, Journal, 1803-1807, 38-39.
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urging the general government to take effective action to
restore American rights on the high seas.
Jefferson, however, was not to be pressured into war
at this time.

He realized how unprepared the United States

was, and he knew that a war would be disastrous for the
country.

Pledged to reduce the national debt, Jefferson

saw war as a step toward that worst of all possible evils,
24
a standing army and navy.

Jefferson, after calling for a

volunteer army, proceeded in his attempt to secure a
peaceful settlement with the British.25
In August 1807, McAfee received news that his militia
company had to make its quota to "fight the British who some
times sense [sic] make an attack on one of our vessels near
Norfold [sic], Virginia."

At the regimental muster at

Harrodsburg, at which Colonels Gabriel Slaughter and
Richard M. Johnson spoke, McAfee reported that he
"scarcely ever saw so much ardor prevail amongst men.
Liberty and a determination to support the honor of our
government prevaded the minds of all. .

,,27

In the summer of 1807, most Kentuckians were convinced

24McElroy, Kentucky Nation's History, 317.
25Kentucky's
share of the volunteer army was 5,212
men, ibid.
26
McAfee, Journal, 1803-1807, 55.
27 Ib1d., 60-61.
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that war with Great Britain was a certainty.

Newspapers in

the state carried reports of the failure of the negotiations between the United States and England and declared
that armed action was the only course left open to the
Americans.

The United States was being ridiculed in the

English papers and a satisfactory agreement was not
expected.

War preparations in England and particularly

Canada were discussed, and the belief by the British that
war was inevitable was recounted in the public press.28
Furthermore, in November 1807, instead of easing
restrictions following the Chesapeake affair, barriers were
strengthened.29
The Chesapeake-Leopard affair was quickly followed by
the bombardment of neutral Copenhagen, Denmark by a British
fleet.

It seemed that neutrality was quickly becoming

impossible.

In a story entitled "No Neutrals--But Allies

or Foes" the Kentucky Gazette of October 27. 1807 reprinted
Francis James

"Copenhagen" Jackson's ultimatum to the

Danish court.

Jackson, the British minister to Denmark.

stated that
. . it is impossible any longer to distinguish
between a neutral and an enemy. That the
ordinary covenants (that is, treaties and the law
of nations) of any neutral nation are not to
stand in the way of British policy or interest.

28
Kentucky Gazette, Oct. 20. 1807.
29Paris (Ky.) Western Citizen, Nov. 17. 1808.
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The implication that neutrals could exist only under
the protection of England

led

the Kentucky Gazette to

inquire if the American people were prepared to place themselves in the benevolent hands of the British.

This paper

asserted that the only courses remaining to the United
States were to submit to British domination or to fight
for independence as she had done barely thirty years
previously.30

The prospects of a peaceful settlement of

differences between the United States and England seemed
bleak 31
Impressment. ship seizures and the Chesapeake outrage
provoked hostility against the British in the West; however
the greatest hostility was produced by the belief held by
most Kentuckians that the British were actively aiding the
Indians in the Northwest territory.

This was considered to

be the one unpardonable crime in the eyes of the
westerners

32

In the Northwest territory, the Indians were reported
to be in a state of unrest in the summer of 1807.

A general

Indian conspiracy was reported to be forming in that

30Kentucky Gazette, Oct. 27. 1807.
31

Ibid.; ibid., Nov. 10, Dec. 22, 1807.

32This was reported to be a false charge by Ernest
Alexander Cruishank, "The Employment of Indians in the War
of 1812." Annual Report of the American Historical Society
for the Year 1895 (Washington, 1896). 321-22.
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section with the avowed purpose of invading Kentucky to
massacre the citizens of the state.

After this invasion

and massacre, the Indians planned, so the report ran, to
live in the houses of the Kentuckians and eat their
33
cattle.

Stories from Detroit reported that the Indians

had massacred several people in that area

There was a

general appeal to the Kentuckians for assistance since the
Indians were said to be afraid of the Kentucky militia.34
A correspondent to the Kentucky Gazette reported a
belief, held by most Kentuckians. that the British were
acting to push the Indians into violence against the
Kentuckians and other westerners.35

Stating that Fort

Malden, a British fort on the Canadian shore of the Detroit
River. was the source of supply for the savages, the
westerners associated, perhaps not incorrectly, the
increased Indian activity with the events in the coastal
waters.36

There seemed no end to the British depredations

upon American rights.

The only alternative to national

humiliation, it seemed, was the use of force to counter the
violence used by the haughty British government.
Further insults were reported in the Kentucky Gazette

33
Kentucky Gazette, Sept. 8. 1807.
34

Ibid., Sept. 22, 1807.

35
Ibid., Sept. 15, 1807.
36
Ibid., Sept. 22, 1807.
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before the meeting of the General Assembly in December
1807.

The execution of one of the impressed crewmen of the

Chesapeake by the British was noted, with the speculation
that the other three prisoners would be executed when the
British felt the occasion justified such action.

Quoting

an article from the Boston Chronicle, the Kentucky Gazette
stated that "Such an outrage [the hanging of the impressed
u37
seaman] has no parallel.

A second attack upon an

American gunboat was reported which further heightened the
38
England was seen as
belligerence of the Kentuckians.
being determined to humiliate the American nation and
people.

The role of neutral seemed doomed under the

tyrannical actions of the British.

Hatred of England,

smoldering since the Revolution, may have produced an antiBritish bias in 1803, but the events of the spring and
summer of 1807 brought this smoldering to a blaze.

The

early hatred may have been strong, but the Chesapeake
affair produced the first widespread talk of war against
the British in Kentucky.
War fever had subsided only slightly by the time of
the annual meeting of the General Assembly of Kentucky in
December 1807.

By December 30, 1807, the day of Governor

Christopher Greenup's annual speech to the combined houses

37Ib1d., Oct. 6, 1807.
38Ibid., Sept. 29, 1807.

36
of the legislature, the Indian trouble in the Northwest had
subsided, lessening somewhat the belligerence of the
Kentuckians.

Although Greenup was able to present a

prosperous picture of Kentucky's domestic economy and a
peaceful account of the relationship between the westerners
and the Indians, he worried that foreign affairs were still
far from settled.
Our commerce continues to be harrassed by several
of the belligerent powers, our rights infringed
and the flag of the United States has been
insulted in a most extraordinary manner, by a
foreign power, who has never ceased to manifest
her hostility toward us, since by the valor and
firmness of the American people their dominion
was shaken off and their schemes of subjegation
and oppression were defeated.
Although Greenup said that the affair was the business
of the general government, he proposed that the General
Assembly adopt a resolution expressing the sentiment of the
people of Kentucky concerning the foreign relations of the
United States.

He further asked that the General Assembly

pledge to co-operate with the actions of the President and
39
the government in Washington.

This clearly was not the

call for belligerent action demanded by the resolutions
passed in the mass meetings during the hot summer days of
1807.

The House of Representatives of the Commonwealth

responded with moderation, and stated in its reply to
Greenup on January 6, 1808 that

39Journal, Kentucky House

1807, 10 (Dec. 30. 1807).
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We the House of Representatives cannot repress
our indignation, when contemplating the acts of
perfidy and murder of the British navy, and with
one voice express a wish that the general government may adopt prompt and effective measures to
support the insulted and degraded majesty of the
American nation, and convince her lordly enemies
that her rights shall not be invaded nor her
dignity insulted with impunity.
. . we are willing not only to express the
public sentiment, but also to pledge our honor,
our blood and treasure in support of such measures
as may be adopted by the general government, to
secure and protect the peace, dignity, and
independence of the union against foreign
invasion, and to chastise and bring to a state of
reason our haughty and imperious foes.40
This was strong language indeed, but hardly a cry for
war by a harried and frustrated victim.

Instead, just as

in 1803 with the Spanish problems, the Kentuckians. as good
Republicans, were willing to place the entire burden of
decision in the hands of Jefferson.

Although war would be

welcomed by the Kentuckians, the general attitude was to
wait until the Jefferson administration could set a course
of action.

The citizens of the Bluegrass state did not

want to force the President into a course that he did not
wish to take.

The westerners were indignant, but they were

still Republicans and disciples of Jefferson, and as such
they waited for the government in Washington to peovide
direction for their actions.
Jefferson's plan for retaliation had been decided and
put into action at the special session of Congress called

40Ibid.. 32-33 (Jan. 6. 1808).
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late in 1807.

On October 27, 1807, Jefferson outlined his

41
program on foreign relations in a message to Congress,
and Congress, on December 22, 1807, following the failure
of negotiations, complied with the wishes of the President
by passing an embargo bill which forbade all American
42
merchant ships from engaging in international commerce.
On December 27, 1807, Jefferson authorized enforcement of
the non-importation action passed in April 1806 which
restricted the flow of British products into the United
States.43

Jefferson was committed to a program of main-

taining a balanced budget and retiring the national debt,
and he feared that war would delay the achievement of these
goals.

War might even lead to the establishment of

standing armies and navies which would forever end governmental austerity and endanger personal freedom.

This, and

the realization that the United States was not prepared to
contest the British Empire in an open military conflict,
led Jefferson to a different approach to the problem.

41 Reprinted in the Nov. 10, 1807 issue of the Kentucky
Gazette. It can be assumed that the Governor and the members of the General Assembly would know the direction taken
by the President before the opening of the legislative
session in December. The Jefferson speech can be found in
A. E. Burgh and A. A. Lipscomb, eds., The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson (20 vols., Washington, 1903), III, 444-53.
42
Burgh and Lipscomb, eds., Writings of Jefferson,
III, 455-56.
43
A complete discussion of the Non-importation Act can
be found in Heaton, "Non-Importation, 1806-1812," 178-98.
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Using the idea employed by the British North American
colonies in 1765, 1767 and 1775, Jefferson decided to
attack the belligerents where it would hurt them most, in
the pocketbook.

He proposed that the United States ban the

importation of goods from warring powers, and, by confining
the American merchant marine to their ports, eliminate
herself from the carrying trade, thus preventing the
British industries from obtaining the raw materials
necessary for their operations.

The Embargo, a tool of

commercial coercion, would force the belligerent powers to
respect American rights and commerce.
Although the Kentuckians were still willing to fight
if need be to secure their rights and to revenge the
injustice of the Chesapeake affair, they consented to give
the Embargo a chance to succeed.

In reply to Greenup's

speech, the General Assembly began drawing up resolutions
on foreign affairs to convey the attitude of Kentuckians to
the general government.

The first resolution proposed in

the House of Representatives was far more belligerent than
that body wished to transmit to Washington.

It stated that

since the United States was on the brink of war "with a
nation that has repeatedly insulted the American flag," the
general government in Washington must know the will of the
people.

Stating that

. . . the people of Kentucky view with abhorrence
and detestation the unparalleled and inhuman
attacks on our neutral rights; and as an

40
honorable adjustment of differences have not; nor
is not expected to take place; they are not only
ready to step forth at their country's call, but
are determined to risque their lives and property
in her defence, and if her liberty must expire
they will expire with it.44
Although this resolution might have expressed the sentiment
of the people of the Commonwealth, it was certainly counter
to the Jeffersonian program of non-violent commercial
coercion.

Because of the inflammatory language of the

resolution, the proposal was quickly replaced by another,
more moderate measure.
On January 15, 1808, another resolution stated that
. . . they the Senate and House of Representatives of the state consider the conduct of Great
Britain in many instances, but more particularly
in the attack upon the Chesapeake, as outrageous
and insulting in the extreme;and such as in the
event of a failure on her part to make honorable
reparation, calls for the severest chastisement.
Resolved, That whatever measures for vindicating
the national honor, the wisdom of the government
may prescribe, shall receive the support of our
best exertions, and the devotion of our lives and
fortunes.45
This second resolution was clearly a blank check which left
the prerogative for action in the hands of the President.
The State Senate. however, showed that violent action
was not completely ruled out.

In a resolution presented in

January 1808, the upper house of the General Assembly
resolved that

44Journal, Kentucky House, 1807, 51 (Jan. 12, 1808).
45Ibid., 62-63
(Jan. 15, 1808).
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The measure pursued by the federal executive to
vindicate our rights without an appeal to arms,
has not been ascertained. Therefore, Resolved,
That although in the opinion of the legislature
the interest and prosperity of the United States
will (if peace can be maintained with dignity and
honor) be more effectually promoted by pursuing a
pacific policy, yet it becomes the representatives of the people of Kentucky, early to provide
the means of resisting the outrages, and punishing the encroachments of any foreign power.
The Senate then proposed that the state militia be prepared
to defend their country by becoming more effectually armed
and disciplined.46

Although the Senate was willing to give

the President a chance to preserve the rights and freedoms
of the American nation through pacific measures, it carefully provided for the eventual use of force should the
noble effort fail.

Kentuckians were willing to follow the

President's program, but they still did not rule out
offensive action against the British government.
Finally, before the legislature adjourned in February.
1808. a law was passed which forbade the use in Kentucky of
English legal precedents in cases argued before state
courts.

As proposed, the law would have excluded all

precedents in English common law.

In order to preserve

what Henry Clay throught was a great system of law, young
Clay convinced the legislature to exclude only those
precedents decided after July 4, 1776 from use in Kentucky

"Ibid., 71 (Jan. 18, 1808).
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courts.

Although the measure was not a killing blow to

Great Britain, it did show the anti-British feeling in the
state.

The Kentuckians could not attack British territory,

so they were forced to look for targets they could reach.
With the passage of this law the General Assembly adjourned
for another year, and agreed to support Jefferson in his
handling of the affair in whatever method he felt
necessary 48
The General Assembly had accepted the Embargo, a
development that was repeated across the state.

This fact

was indicated at a public dinner in Lexington, given for
newly appointed governor of Upper Louisiana, Meriwether
Lewis, early in 1808.

Following toasts to the United

States, the Union and the Constitution. came toasts to the
Ocean ("Free as the air we breathe--the nation who
arrogates dominion over it, should be treated as a
pirate"), The Embargo ("Its operation will prove the wisdom
in which it originated"), National Dignity ("preferable to
the merchandize of Europe--or of the world") and Home
Manufactures ("They will ultimately afford us an idemnity

47Glyndon Van Dusen. The Life of Henry Clay (Boston,
1937), 49; William Littell, The Statute Law of Kentucky
with Notes Praetections, and Observations on the Public
Acts (5 vols., Frankfort, 1811). III, 457.
48This measure was similar in effect to the public
renaming of German Shepherd dogs during World War I. It
did not have any effect upon the enemy but it did make the
people feel better.
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for the losses of war").

That these toasts were all

offered before the toast to retiring President Jefferson
49
In
indicated the importance of the issue in Kentucky.
the West, manylooked upon Jefferson very highly; anything
that could relegate him to a lesser position was important
indeed.
Thus early in 1808 the people of Kentucky generally
settled down to allow the commercial coercion to force the
British to respect American rights.

However, the relative

calm would not improve the Kentuckians' attitude toward the
British, as diplomatic insults and threats as well as
domestic economic depression would combine to increase
malevolence toward the British in the West.

49Kentucky Gazette, Jan. 26, 1808.

CHAPTER III
DEPRESSION IN THE WEST AND DIPLOMATIC INSULTS
Throughout 1808 most Kentuckians remained consistent
in their support of Jefferson's Embargo, even though the
West experienced an economic depression which prostrated
commercial agriculture in the region.

Following the peak

year of 1805, produce prices at New Orleans fell over 20%
by 1808, a drastic blow to the frontier farmer who had
borrowed money to expand when the future was promising and
was then forced to repay the loans when money constricted.
Prices had risen due to the optimism following the purchase
of Louisiana, and they remained high throughout 1805.

They

declined only slightly in 1806 and 1807. but 1808 was a
1
true depression year.

From 1808 until the War of 1812,

prices remained disastrously low in the West.

Although

they rose slightly from October 1809 through February 1811,
they declined to a ruinously low level until war was
declared in April 1812.

Despite the slight recovery in

1809-1811, prices still remained 11-15% below the peak year

'George R. Taylor. "Agrarian Discontent," 488; George
Rogers Taylor. "Prices in the Mississippi Valley Preceding
the War of 1812," Journal of Economic and Business History,
III (Nov. 1930). 149.
44
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of 1805, and were a constant cause for worry in the Western
2
country.
To make the situation even worse, the Western farmers
were forced to pay relatively higher prices for the goods
that they bought through New Orleans.

Prices for produce

and imported goods were close to parity in 1805, but by
1808, although import prices had fallen over 10%, produce
prices had fallen over 20%.

Furthermore, when produce

prices were recovering slightly to 11-15% lower than 1805
prices, the prices of imports rose almost to equity with
the 1805 import prices.

Thus the farmer in the West had to

accept lower prices for his goods when he sold them and at
the same time had to pay basically the same prices for the
goods that he bought.

This was the reason for much of the

discontent in the West in the years preceding the War of
3
1812.
To the frontier Republican farmer the reasons for this
depression were obvious; the British and French commercial
decrees and orders against neutral shipping had forced the
United States from foreign markets and created an excess of
produce which drove prices to their low levels.

The

Federalists, on the other hand, saw the origins of the
depression in the Embargo passed by the Republicans and

2
Taylor, "Prices Mississippi Valley," 149.
1. Appendix I.
3
Ibid., 161.

See chart 2, Appendix I.

See chart
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urged that if American ships were allowed to trade with the
belligerents, then the excess produce could be sold, and
prosperity would be restored to the nation, which would
allow both farmer and shipper to make a profit.4
George R. Taylor in his study of the depression in the
West during the pre-war years concludes that the depression
would have occurred had there been no Embargo or European
5
orders and decrees.

He states that the West had several

problems dealing with transportation, communication and
finance to solve before lasting prosperity could be
achieved in the region.

None of these problems individ-

ually would have been disastrous, but together they
6
combined to form a barrier to Western prosperity.

The

bubble of 1805 was largely due to increased speculation and
emigration following the purchase of Louisiana, and,
without a solid basis for prosperity, the bubble was bound
7
to burst.

The year 1808 marked the collapse of the

artificially high prices and brought in economic decline.
When the depression occurred, all Western enterprises, with
the exception of the hemp producers and manufacturers

4
Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent," 490; Reginald Horsman,
"Western War Aims, 1811-1812," Indiana Magazine of History,
LIII (March 1957), 6.
5
Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent," 474.
6
Ibid., 474-84.
7Ibid., 471-72.
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around Lexington, were drastically hurt.8

This econcmic

crisis would continue until the war began and would be a
constant reminder of the greed and the cupidity of the
British government and people who were seen as the agents
creating the depression by the western farmers.
The westerners, however, failed to see the depression
as the result of normal economic occurrences.

Furthermore,

they refused to believe the Federalist charge that the
Embargo was solely responsible for their plight.

The real

culprits in the eyes of the Kentuckians were the British
and the French and their commercial restrictions of 1806
9
and 1807.
After the battle of Trafalgar on October 21, 1805, the
French fleet was effectively removed as an offensive threat
to the English."

Napoleon realized that without a fleet

he could not hope to invade England, and he looked for
other means of conquering the "nation of shopkeepers."

The

method he arrived at was an economic policy which attempted
to prostrate the industrial and commercial basis upon which
England depended.

Napoleon's plan was to close European

markets to the products of English workmen, thus leading to
unemployment, poverty and finally complete economic ruin of

8Ibid.

485.

9Ibid., 490; Reginald Horsman, "Western War Aims," 6.
10
Bailey, Diplomatic History. 114.
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the British Empire.

The first decree of the French

dictator outlined his Continental System, closed all
European ports under his command to British goods and
shipping, and barred them to neutral shipping that had
called upon a British port before landing in continental
Europe.

The Berlin Decree was expanded by the Milan Decree

of December 17, 1807.

11

In retaliation to the Berlin Decree, the British
government issued a series of Orders-in-Council which it
hoped would weaken Napoleon.

The British program included

restricting contraband goods shipped in neutral bottoms,
the raising of revenue to aid England in her war effort on
the continent, and finally eliminating neutral commerce to
the European powers and replacing neutrals with British
merchants for British profit.

This program was outlined in

the Order-in-Council of January 7, 1807 and strengthened by
the Order of November 11, 1807.

12

Each belligerent, in trying to weaken the power of its
rival, attacked neutral shipping.

Neutrals were thus

caught between the power of both countries.

Harassed by

the might of the British navy on the open seas and by the
French dictator through his control of the continental
ports, American shipping, as well as that of other neutrals,
was placed in a precarious position.

"Ibid.; Bemis, Diplomatic History, 148.
12Bemis, Diplomatic History, 149.
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To Kentuckians, the real villain responsible for the
falling prices for produce was the British restrictions
upon neutral shipping.

The depression was blamed upon the

closing of markets to American goods by the struggling
powers.

American neutrality no longer served as a shield

to protect American trade with both warring camps of
Europe.

Because of European distress, American commerce

had grown, but in 1807-1808 this growth seemed threatened
by the tyranny of the belligerents.

The solution to the

problem was the removal of European trade restrictions
placed upon neutral shipping.
Thus during 1808 Kentuckians had a year of depression
to ponder until the re-opening of the General Assembly in
December.

Anti-British articles appearing in Kentucky

newspapers denounced the British government for instigating
the renewed European conflict in order to dominate all of
Europe and to suppress the French Revolution.

13

Reveling

in British misfortune, the Kentuckians vented their hatred
upon the foe they felt was grasping greedily for control of
the world.14

Although accommodation with Great Britain was

not expected, accord with France seemed possible, a
prospect that was well received by the Kentucky press.15

13ftris (Ky.) Western Citizen, November 17, 1808;
McAfee. War in the Western Country, 7.
14Paris Western Citizen, November 17, 1808.
15
Ibid.
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Although most people were in favor of the Embargo, a
small minority, mostly Federalists, was in opposition.
Led by Humphrey Marshall, a Federalist and cousin and
brother-in-law of the Chief Justice, and Matthew Lyon, a
Republican and former New Englander sitting in the United
States Congress from a western Kentucky district,
opposition to the President's commercial coercion received
criticism upon the grounds that it was destroying what it
was attempting to protect.

Marshall, rabidly anti-

Jefferson, based his opposition upon the contention that
the Embargo was injurious to American shipping while France
and England were unaffected.16

Matthew Lyon realized that

America was not yet prepared for war with England.

Further-

more he agreed with Marshall that the Embargo was not an
effective way to coerce the British.

He realized that

although the American people should, theoretically, have
freedom of the seas, this could not be as long as the
United States remained weak militarily.

17

Apart from these

few dissenters, the great majority of the people supported
the Embargo and Jefferson's commercial coercion.

Accord

with England was not expected and the Embargo seemed the
best alternative available.I8

"Van Dusen. Henry Clay, 52.
17Lyda Peek Smith, "Matthew Lyon in Kentucky"
(masters thesis. Western Kentucky University, 1932), 82-83.
18
Bardstown (Ky.) Candid Review. March 22. 1808.
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The Embargo was supported by most Kentuckians, despite
the fact that it was counter to their first reaction to the
British outrage, for four very important reasons.

First,

it was proposed and supported by Jefferson, who was revered
in the western country.

19

Second, it did provide a method

of resisting European aggressions and maintaining American
honor without taking arms against the might of the British
Empire, a measure which many realized would be disastrous
20
Third, they supported the
militarily and economically.
Embargo as a tool to open European markets closed by the
various decrees and orders.

21

Fourth, within a few years

Kentuckians realized that the Embargo protected them from
foreign manufactured goods, which led to the development of
manufacturing in the West, particularly around Lexington.

19Mayo, Henry Clay, 285; Taylor "Agricultural
Discontent Mississippi Valley," 489.
2
°This was hinted at in a letter from James Taylor, a
prominent northern Kentuckian, to his distant cousin, James
Madison, November 29, 1808, in James A. Padgett, ed.,
"Letters of James Taylor to the Presidents of the United
States," Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, XXXIV
(July 1936), 251. A clearer statement can be found in
Clay's resolution before the Kentucky House of Representatives. See Hopkins and Hargraves, eds.. Clay Papers, III,
388-89; Acts Passed at the First Session of the Seventeenth
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky begun
. . 12th. day of December, 1808. . . . (Frankfort,
1809), 131. The latter source will be hereafter referred
to as Acts. See also Mayo, Henry Clay, 54.
21
Taylor, "Agricultural Discontent Mississippi
Valley," 488-90.
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Manufacturing was seen early as a profitable enterprise for
the Kentuckians and many newspaper articles urged the state
to expand manufacturing.22
In December 1808, Governor Charles Scott made his
initial speech to the state legislature.

He urged military

preparedness, in event of possible war with the belligerents, and the promotion of home manufactures to make
America independent of Europe.

Scott denounced equally the

French and the British in his statement.

23

In their reply

to Scott's address, the Representatives agreed that the
outrages had been committed by both England and France and
that "resistance, in some form, is obviously the painful
duty alone left to the general government."

Whatever

course the nation followed, embargo or war, they pledged

22Coulter, "Prologue,"
Clift, Remember the Raisin, 1.
Lexington was rapidly becoming an industrial town, and by
1811, a British traveller reported that most all the buildings of the city were of brick and the streets were nearly
all paved. He stated that the primary manufactures of the
town consisted of thirteen rope-walks, five bagging
factories, eight cotton factories, three woolen factories,
one factory producing duck cloth and one producing oil
cloth. Besides these organized factories, he also reported
three dozen skilled trades carried on in the city, with
artisans ranging from smiths to watch-makers. Lexington
was the hotbed of protectionism in the state. To these
protectionists, the only barrier better than a tariff was
an embargo and non-intercourse with the European powers.
Thus the Eastern states would be forced to buy from the
rapidly growing industr1l117ed western country. John
Melish, Travels Through the United States of North America
in the Years 1806 and 1807 and 1809, 1810, and 1811 (2
vols., Philadelphia. 1812). II, 184-89.
23Kentucky Gazette. Jan. 5, 1808; Journal, Kentucky
House, 1808. 13-16 (Dec. 13. 1808).
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that Kentuckians would support the endeavor "with
patriotism."

The Embargo, although it may have produced

some economic distress in the country, was less an evil
than war and might "produce a sense of justice in the
24
belligerents."

The House of Representatives was willing

to support the Embargo as an alternative to war, but it was
ready to support more violent action if the government in
Washington called for it.
The real excitement of the session came later in
December, however, when Robert Scroggin, Bourbon County
representative in the House of Representatives, presented a
resolution concerning the Embargo and the Jefferson administration.

Rewriting the resolution, Clay offered his

version on December 16, 1808.

It commended the Jefferson

administration and called the Embargo "a measure highly
judicious, and . • . an honorable expedient to avoid war.
• . ."

Furthermore, it pledged the Kentuckians' "most

energetic support" to the general government in its efforts
to resist the tyranny of the European belligerents and
agreed to support whatever action the national government
might take, be it "war, a total non-intercourse, or a more
rigid execution of the Embargo system. . . ."

Finally,

noting the coming retirement of Kentucky's political idol,
Thomas Jefferson, the resolution stated that Jefferson was

24Journal, Kentucky House, 1808, 77-78 (Dec. 29, 1808).
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"entitled to the thanks of his country, for the ability,
uprightness and intellegence which he has displayed in the
management of our foreign relations and domestic
concerns.
Although the resolution was favored by almost all the
members of the House of Representatives. Humphrey Marshall
could not allow such a complimentary resolution to pass
without comment and presented a resolution to counter
Clay's.

Marshall resolved that all nations had the right

to navigate the open seas, and that war was an evil and
should only be entered after pacific actions were taken to
preserve the peace.

However, for several years past the

British and the French had violated the rights of the
United States, and after unsuccessfully trying to resolve
the problems with the belligerents, the general government
passed an Embargo which damaged American commerce more than
it hurt the belligerents.

He said that the only manly

thing for the United States to do was to stop all intercourse with the belligerents and protect American shipping
by instituting convoys and arming merchant ships.

He

further declared that any resort to force by either of the
belligerents would be construed as a declaration of war
against the United States.

Finally, he proposed that the

25
Acts 1808, 131; Amendment of Resolution on Foreign
Relations, December 15, 1808, Hopkins and Hargraves, ed.,
Clay Papers, I, 388-89.
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Commonwealth pledge any support that might be "necessary
and proper to protect the rights and citizens, and maintain
the honour and independence of the nation."
Although both men called for resistance to European
aggressions, Marshall's resolution was anti-Jefferson while
Clay's was pro-Jefferson.

Furthermore, Marshall would

write later that his resolution was "impartial as to France
and England, [and] might as readily lead to peace or war
with the one as the other.

Things utterly repugnant to the

first principles of Jeffersonian policy, now devolved on
the care and management of President Madison."

While this

may have been an overstatement, it is indicative of the
anti-Republican and anti-Jefferson feelings of Humphrey
Marshall and a few Kentuckians.

26

When a vote was finally taken, Marshall cast the only
vote for his resolution, while Clay's resolution passed
27
Kentuckians
with only Marshall's vote in opposition.
were still willing to follow the program of Jefferson and
had not lost their ardor for the leader of their party and
country.
In a final attempt to lash out at the British and at
the same time encourage domestic manufacturing, the House
of Representatives, before adjourning, passed a resolution

26
Humphrey Marshall, The History of Kentucky (2 vols
Frankfort, 1824), II, 460-62.
27
McElroy, Kentucky in Nation's History, 318-19.
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which encouraged the people of the Commonwealth to support
products made in the United States and pledged that the
members of the General Assembly would wear only clothes
28
Presented by Clay, the
made of American produced cloth.
resolution drew immediate opposition from Marshall.
Following the passage of the resolution, Marshall persisted
in wearing clothing of obvious European manufacture, an
occurrence which greatly upset the Jeffersonians and led to
spirited debate between Marshall and Clay.

In the course

of the argument, Marshall questioned the truthfulness of
some of Clay's statements.

This insult led to the Clay-

Marshall duel of January 26, 1809 in which three shots were
exchanged.

29

Kentuckians were sensitive to personal

insults and slights, and the gentlemanly code of conduct
prescribed a recourse to arms.

Was it surprising then that

Kentuckians were anxious to resort to violence to rectify
an insult to the national honor?
Kentuckians waited patiently in 1807 and 1808 for the
general government to restore America's honor.

In these

years belligerent alternatives were replaced by commercial

28Resolution to Encourage Use of American Manufactures, January 3, 1809. Hopkins and Hargraves, eds., Clay
Papers, I, 396-97; Acts, 1808, 133-34.
29
Clay's challenge and Marshall's acceptance as well
as Clay's report of the incident can be found in Clay to
Humphrey Marshall. Jan. 4. 1809. Hopkins and Hargraves,
eds., Clay Papers, I, 397; Marshall to Clay, Jan. 4, 1809.
ibid., 398; and Clay to James Clark, Jan. 19, 1809,ibid..
400-01.
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coercion.

However, the deepening depression and renewed

Indian problems in the following years would alter this
course.

The call for war originally expressed to revenge

national honor following the Chesapeake Affair and other
factors contributed to a more complex situation following
1808.

Added to the economic hardship, blamed upon the

British and the French restrictions, were several diplomatic blunders which were interpreted by the Americans as
insults at the hands of the British.

The first of these

was the so-called Erskine Affair of 1809.
Upon assuming the presidency in 1809, James Madison
presented the nation a new method of opposing the British
and French commercial restrictions.

By the time Madison

took office, it had become evident that the Embargo had
largely been a failure.

In order to coerce the British and

French, Madison proposed, in the Non-Intercourse Act which
was passed, that American ports and commerce be reopened to
all nations except the British and French.

This discrimi-

nation was to end only when the belligerents agreed to
repeal their restrictions upon neutral American commerce.
This was definitely a victory for the New England Federalists and the shippers they represented as well as the
British, who, unlike the French, could get goods indirectly
through second parties.

Whatever the weaknesses of the

Embargo, even those historians who think that the Embargo
possibly could have forced the British and the French to
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remove their restrictions agree that the Non-Intercourse
30
Act was doomed to failure.
Although Madison tried a new tactic in coercing the
British, his main efforts were channeled toward effecting
an agreement through the British Minister to the United
States, David M. Erskine.

Erskine had told British Foreign

Minister George Canning in December 1808 that the United
States would equalize the position of the British and
French shipping to the United States.

By making the Non-

Importation Act, which had been applicable to British
shipping only, apply to French shipping as well, and by
forbidding French war ships from entering American ports it
would give England equal rights with France.

After the

passage of the Non-Intercourse Act the British complaint
that they were being discriminated against relative to

France would be settled.

Furthermore, Congress was in the

process of passing a law which would forbid American ships
to employ foreign seamen, which would end the problem of
impressment.

Finally, the United States, according to

Albert Gallatin, was willing to abide by the Rule of 1756,
in refusing to claim rights to trade with markets that were
normally closed to her in time of peace.

It appeared that

American-British problems were about to be solved to the

30Mayo. Clay, 323; Louis Martin Sears, Jefferson and
the Embargo (New York, 1966: originally published 1927).
195.
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benefit of the British.

It was for these reasons that

Canning received the news of the passage of the Non31
Intercourse Act with great favor.
Erskine, very pro-American, desired to remove the
problems that had come between the United States and
Britain, and this bias may have been responsible for
influencing his dispatches to Canning.

Erskine was very

anxious to believe the best in regard to the United States
attitudes toward the British, and Canning took Erskine's
32
word for the conditions in the United States.
Acting upon such favorable information. Canning
proposed that the British government was willing to
. . . (1) withdraw her Orders-in-Council of
January and November, 1807, in so far as they
touched American shipping, and the United States
in turn to repeal contemporaneously all nonimportation and non-intercourse acts against
Great Britain as well as interdiction of its
waters to British ships of war; (2) the NonIntercourse Act to go into effect immediately
against France. and to be enforced by the British
navy, which should have a right to capture
American ships violating it; (3) the United
States to accept the Rule of 1756.33
Erskine was instructed to read this communication directly
to the American Secretary of State; instead he began to

31

Charles C. Tansill, "Robert Smith," in Samuel Flagg
Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State and Their
Diplomacy (10 vols., New York, 1963; originally published,
1928), III, 158.
32
Tansill, "Smith." 158-59.
33
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negotiate with Robert Smith, Secretary of State, without
letting Smith know exactly what the British Foreign
Minister was demanding.

It was this disregard of orders

that brought about the Erskine Affair and the British
government's repudiation of that minister.34
Immediately after receiving these directions, Erskine
and Smith worked out an understanding concerning the
Chesapeake Affair.

Madison no longer pressed for a court-

martial for Admiral Berkeley's actions, and Erskine agreed
to restore the men taken from the Chesapeake and to make
reparations to those who had been wounded and the families
of those killed in the attack.

Having taken care of the

major barrier to an American-British accord, Erskine then
turned to the larger question of impressment.
He approached the President and on April 19, 1809, an
agreement was made whereby the British would withdraw the
Orders-in-Council as they pertained to the United States as
of June 10, 1809 and the Americans would repeal the NonIntercourse Act.

When news of the agreement became public,

many were overjoyed.

Even the Federalists were glad to

find that the Republicans had been able to effect a settlement with the British over the question of neutral rights.
New England shippers responded to the good news by sending
hundreds of American ships to Europe to take advantage of

34
Tansill, "Smith," 159.
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the renewed opportunities.

Prosperity seemed imminent for

the American shippers and producers who had suffered under
the hardship of both the Orders-in-Council and the Embargo.
However, Erskine had clearly violated his instructions
by not revealing his instructions to the Americans.

He led

the Americans to believe that all Britain expected of them
was the repeal of the economic coercive measures aimed at
the British merchants; he did not tell the American
negotiators that the British government expected the United
States to maintain a belligerent attitude toward Napoleon
and the French.

Erskine avoided mentioning this require-

ment because he realized that the United States could not
accept such a provision.

Because Erskine had both dis-

obeyed and exceeded his instructions, Canning quite
correctly repudiated the agreement drawn up by the minister
and called for his return to Britain.

Coincidentally, the

British issued new Orders-in-Council which extended the
paper blockage of Europe and increased the British duty
upon cotton which, along with the repudiation of the
Erskine agreement, caused considerable distress in the
United States.

After the seizures of the ships sent to the

continent by the American merchants, and the receipt of the
repudiation of the Erskine agreement, the United States
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reluctantly reinstituted non-intercourse against the
British and the crisis began again.35
Just as the Federalists had applauded the Erskine
agreement, they also denounced the perfidity of the British
in rejecting the treaty.

Many Westerners came to the

defense of the administration when the treaty fell
36
through.

In the West, however, there was a different

attitude toward the rejected treaty.

The Erskine Treaty

was viewed with suspicion by the Westerners because it
37
The
would open up direct trade with the British.
Lexington Reporter commented on May 13. 1809 that the
monopoly given the British manufacturers by the Erskine
treaty would aid the British and hurt the Americans.
What will be the price of our produce confined
and concentrated totally in British warehouses?
Where will be our carrying trade? Why, British
merchants and British manufacturers will purchase
our productions for the mere expense of shipping
and the duties and commissions to London and
Liverpool merchants! . . . Britain will have
gained a most glorious victory. . . .
What is become of the 100,000 hogshead of Tobacco
exported from the United States? Will Britain
consume and manufacture all our cotton? No, not
one tenth of our Tobacco--not one half of our

35Irving Brant, The Fourth President: A Life of James
Madison (Indianapolis and New York, 1970), 411-16.
36
James Taylor to James Madison, August 11, 1809. in
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August 11, 1809. ibid.. 260.
37
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cotton; and our flour, our grain, our ashes, our
staves and every other property must center
38
there.
To the western farmer, the Erskine agreement meant little
more than an opportunity for the British to obtain raw
materials for the lowest possible price.
Opposition was also mounted for quite another reason.
Many people in the West advocated the encouragement of
industry to offset the economic dislocation attributed to
the British and French commercial restrictions.

The

Kentucky Gazette of January 31, 1809 argued that
Never was there so fine an opportunity of establishing (Manufactures) as now--particularly those
of cotton. . . . This is a 'golden oportunity,i
which I pray may be improved by the industrious
enterprize of our citizens and the patriotic
guardianship of Congress. But in great undertakings we cannot avoid taking a prospect of the
future. Suppose a peace settled between England
and America--without 'protecting duties' being
laid on the importation of foreign goods--what
will be the inexitable consequence?
American manufacturers, who have inserted all
their money in machinery, materials, etc. will be
ruined and overwhelmed by the inundations of
British goods. The patriotic adventurer will be
sacrificed for his pains.
•

•

•

The editor then suggested that a protective tariff was
needed to

aid

the infant industries of the country

and to protect them in case of peace.

He then warned,

"If we avail ourselves of this lucky conjucture of things,

38
Lexington Reporter, May 13, 1809, quoted in Taylor
"Agrarian Discontent," 492-93.
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we may render our country really independant. .

1139

Thus the tensions between the United States and the British
were not viewed by all segments of the society and of the
country as being necessarily harmful.
Echoing this sentiment, Adam Beatty, a member of the
Kentucky legislature, introduced a bill in the Kentucky
House of Representatives that would have placed a bounty on
the raising of marino sheep.

He drove home his point by

concluding that "so long as we are obliged to resort to a
foreign nation for a supply of a necessary of life, we
40
shall in some way be dependant upon that nation."

The

Lexington Reporter, in a dire warning of the damage done to
American farmers by the Erskine agreement, noted that "Our
manufacturers will be annihilated," by the renewed importation of British manufactures.

Thus, although many

Westerners supported the Erskine agreement, there were
others who failed to see advantages for themselves and/or
41
their section in such a treaty.
This did not lessen the insult felt by the West when
the news of the repudiation of the Erskine agreement
reached the country.

Mass meetings and cries of "British

39Kentucky Gazette, Jan. 31. 1809.
40Washington, Ky., Dove Feb. 17, 1810. The raising
of Marino sheep to begin commercial operations was advocated by the Kentucky Gazette as early as Feb. 7, 1809.
41Taylor. "Agrarian Discontent," 493.
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perfidy" met the news of the repudiation.42

Bitterness

against the British rose as the western farmers tended to
blame the Orders-in-Council for their economic difficulties, a feeling that was compounded by the insult to
American soveriegnty implied by the repudiation of the
measure that would have insured American rights on the
seas.

Another British insult had increased the tension and

43
frustration growing in the western country.
When the repudiation notice reached Washington,
Madison reversed the position he had taken after the agreement was drawn up by reinstating, on August 9, 1809, the
non-intercourse provisions against the British.

Most of

the Republican party continued to support him in his
measures of commercial coercion.

Tension was not relieved

when news of Erskine's replacement was made public.
The man chosen for the delicate negotiations between
the British and the Americans was the "hatchet man of the
Foreign Office," Francis James "Copenhagen" Jackson.
Jackson as special ambassador to the Danish court in 1807
had presented an ultimatum to the Prince Regent of Denmark
to abandon neutrality.

When the Prince Regent refused to

do so, the waiting British fleet opened fire on Copenhagen,
destroying that city and killing hundreds.

43
Brant, Fourth President, 416.

Jackson had
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given the order for the bombardment, and for this action
was given the nickname that was to follow him throughout
life.

Therefore by the time Jackson arrived in the United

States, his positions on neutrals and neutrality were well
known.

Madison returned home to Montpelier to await the

arrival of Jackson, a show of unconcern that was matched by
Jackson.

The chauvinistic Jackson was appalled at the

files of ex-minister Erskine, calling them "a mass of folly
and stupidity" which, according to Brant, "made it charity
to call him [Erskine] a fool.“44

Jackson accused Erskine

of being too easy on the Americans and said that he would
respond to the American insults in a much different manner.
"Perhaps if I can make them believe, as they safely may,
that I shall give blow by blow, they will leave me in
peace.”

Jackson then went about his work of returning

"blow for blow."45
Unable to cope with Jackson, Smith had the negotiations taken from his hands by the President, and the talks
became instead a series of notes exchanged between Jackson
and Smith, with the latter's notes written by Madison.
Both sides refused to make concessions, and Jackson, after
reading a 4,000 word letter written by Madison, "exploded
with anger and frustration."

44Ibid., 417.
45
Ib1d., 418.

He claimed
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Madison is now as obstinate as a mule. . . .
[Nothing] will suit him but the absolute surrender of our Orders-in-Council. Until he gets that,
he will not even accept any satisfaction for the
affair of the 'Chesapeake.' If, after this, we
give them any satisfaction at all, we had better
send it wrapped up in a British ensign, and
desire them to make what use of it they please."
After exchanging a number of sharp notes, Jackson
withdrew his delegation from Washington and went to New
York, where he attempted to go over the head of the
President by appealing to the American people.

By making

this move, Jackson lost any chance of working out an agreement with Madison.

Following this action, Madison called

for the withdrawal of the British minister, leaving both
47
sides with ill-feelings.
From the beginning many Kentuckians were dissatisfied
with the actions of the British government in this affair.
James Taylor of northern Kentucky wrote to his cousin's
husband, James Madison, that the people in the state "are
very indignant at the conduct of the British government and
highly approve that of our own."48

The Kentuckians were

very upset with the insults offered by Jackson, and this
situation drove many of them to violent words if not to
action.

In Shelbyville two lawyers, Isham Talbot and

46Ibid.,
419.
47Ibid., 420-22.
48James Taylor to Madison,
October 20, 1890. Padgett,
ed., "Letters of James Taylor to the Presidents of the
United States," 260.
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William Cook, were charged with violating the state law
against the use of profanity in a public place.
reportedly exclaimed "G

Talbot

damn Mr. Jackson; --the President

ought to . . . have him kicked from town to town until he is
kicked out of the country.
yelled, "G

G

damn him!"

Cook reportedly

damn Timothy Pickering--he ought to be

hung!"49
The General Assembly, meeting in December and January
of 1809-1810, drew up a resolution to protest the actions
of Jackson.

They objected to

. . . the indecorous and unbecoming style used by
Mr. Jackson, his Britannic Majesty's minister
near the United States, in his correspondence
with the Secretary of State, and above all his
insulting imputations against the veracity and
integrity of our government, were such as fully
authorized the refusal, on the part of the
Executive, any longer to recognize his diplomatic
character. Resolved, that the insidious appeal
made by the said Jackson to the people of the
United States, under the disguise of a circular,
addressed to the members of the diplomatic corps
in the United States deserves the execration of
every patriotic citizen. Resolved, that the
General Assembly view with entire approbation,
the conduct of our government in dismissing said
Jackson, and that whatever may be the consequences
resulting therefrom, the state of Kentucky will
be ready to meet them, and will most cordially
cooperate in the support of such measures as may
be necessary to secure the interests, and maintain the honor and dignity of the nation."
The same General Assembly made a move that brought

49
Quoted in Mayo, Clay, 325.
50Acts, 1809, 167-68.
January 22. 1810.

The resolution was passed
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Henry Clay to national attention.

To fill the vacancy left

by the retirement of Buckner Thruston, Senator from
Kentucky, the legislature chose Henry Clay to fill the
unexpired term, promoting the future "War Hawk" from the
state scene to the national.

51

One of the major chores of

the Congress convening in the late days of 1809 was to
draft and pass a measure to replace the Non-Intercourse
Act; the act was generally considered to be impotent and
the national treasury was in dire straits because of the
lack of revenue from import duties.

The measure was drawn

up by Albert Gallatin and introduced by Nathanial Macon of
North Carolina, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs
Committee.

The original bill, known later as the Macon

Bill No. 1,
. . . provided for repeal of the Non-Intercourse
Act (about to expire anyway), excluded British
and French vessels (except in distress or on
public business) from American harbors, and
limited importations of British and French goods
to those shipped in American vessels directly
from the country of production. . . . Like
earlier measures, this one authorized the
President to lift the restrictions on either
belligerent in case it ceased to violatR the
neutral commerce of the United States.5z
Although the Macon Bill was far less restrictive than
either the Embargo or the Non-Intercourse Act, the Senate
stripped it of its vitality by reducing it to a mere

51Hopkins and Hargraves, eds.. Clay Papers, I, 434n.
52
Brant, The Fourth President, 426.
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statement excluding belligerent war ships from American
territorial waters.

It was in response to this measure

that the young Senator from Kentucky first rose to speak.53
He had just taken his seat and under normal circumstances would not rise to speak, Clay stated,
. . .but Sir, when the regular troops of this
house, disciplined as they are in the great
affairs of the nation, are inactive at their
post, it becomes the duty of its raw militia,
however lately enlisted, to step forth in defynce
of the honor and independence of the country.34
Clay said that the Non-Intercourse Act was bad, but it did
give some protection to American manufactures.

Further-

more, the commercial coercive acts were
. . . an opposition to the offensive measures of
the belligerents . . . They presented resistence
. . .--the peaceful resistence of the law. When
this is abandoned, with effect, I am for
resistence by the sword.
No man in the nation desires peace more than I.
But I prefer the troubled ocean of war,
demanded by the honor and independence of the
country, with all its calamities, and desolations, to the tranquil, putrescent pool of
ignominious peace.55
He then stated that the objections of the New Englanders

53At the beginning of the
session, Clay had not yet
reached the constitutional requirement of 30 years. a fact
that was ignored by the Kentucky General Assembly and his
Senate colleagues. Mayo, Clay, 270.
54"
Speech on the Proposed Repeal of the NonIntercourse Act," February 22, 1810, Hopkins and Hargraves,
eds., Clay Papers. I, 448.
55
Ibid.. 448-49.
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were false and maintained that there was a way for the
Americans to take the war to the British.

He stated that

the British could be injured and the Americans could be
aided.

He told the Senate that

The conquest of Canada is in your power, I trust
I shall not be deemed presumptuous when I state,
what I verily believe, that the militia of
Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal
and upper Canada at your feet. . . . Is it
nothing to use to extinguish the torch that
lights up savage warfare? Is it nothing to
acquire the entire fur trade connected with that
country, and to destroy the temptation and the
opportunity of violating your revenue and other
laws?56
Commenting on the contention that the British navy was the
only barrier to France's conquest of the United States,
Clay replied
I am willing, sir, to dispense with the parental
tenderness of the British navy. I cannot subscribe to British slavery upon the water, that we
escape French subjugation upon land.57
The final part of his speech was then an attack upon the
emaciated Macon Bill.

Clay attempted to have the Senate

replace it with one that would have more teeth to it.58
This speech is often cited as the opening gun for the
War Hawks' struggle for war and a call for American
conquest of Canada; in reality, it was nothing of the sort.
The true intention of Clay was to get the Senate to make a

56Ibid., 449-50.
57Ibid., 451.
58
Ibid.
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stronger stand on protecting American commerce, and to
force the British to remove their commercial restrictions.
This is clearly pointed out in a letter written by Clay to
Thomas Smith on February 23, 1810, the day following Clay's
address.
On yesterday the bill respecting our foreign
intercourse, as amended in the Senate, passed,
and was sent to the House of Representatives
where it is confidently believed the amendment of
the Senate will be concurred in--Should this take
place, all our commercial restrictions having in
view the coercion of foreign governments to abrogate their edicts, will be abandonedi and our
commerce once more left to its fate.09
Further insight into the meaning of the speech can be
found in the next speech that Clay made on the Senate floor
when he came to the defense of John Pope's suggestion that
the national government protect infant American industries.
The United States would not become another England overnight, Clay said; rather, it would only produce manufactured goods that it needed.

The purpose of protection

would be to encourage sufficient manufacturing to make the
United States economically independent from Europe.

Clay's

speech on February 22 therefore was a cry for the continuation of commercial barriers against British manufacturers.6°
The tariff and the Non-Intercourse Acts had aided Kentucky
industries, and Lexington, as the center of manufacturing

59Clay to [Thomas Smith), [Feb. 23, 1810), ibid., 452.
60
"Speech on Domestic Manufactures" [March 26, 1810),
ibid., 459.
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in the state, desired some further protection for its
industries.

This is what the junior Senator from Kentucky

was calling for in his speech of February 22, 1810.

He

wanted commercial coercion that would force the British and
the French to stop seizing American shipments being sent to
the European nations, but he also wanted a commercial
device that would restrict the inflow of British goods
coming into the United States.

The Embargo was a possible

means of achieving both these ends, and, following its
repeal and the repeal of the Non-Intercourse Act, Clay
called for the institution of a new means of protecting the
infant industries that had developed during the struggles
with Britain.

The desire to protect the nation's honor may

have been present in the speech, but another goal was to
bring about the defeat of a bill that would end the

protec-

tion offered by the Embargo and the Non-Intercourse Act.
Clay was joined by several congressmen who were
anxious to take a more positive approach to the British
problem than were the older Senators.

Joseph Desha, member

of the House of Representatives from Kentucky, stated on
February 17. 1810 that
. . . we are verifying what the belligerents have
said of us. that we were a nation of words and
not of acts, too great an itching for for [sic]
spouting, an apparent want of energy and
decision--twelve weeks of the session have passed
by, and nothing done worthy of your notice, our
time principally consumed, in lengthy and I might
add unecessary [sic) debates on unimportant
subjects, while the great national concerns,
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touching on foreign relations are kept in the
background--which (to a man who has not been
taught to believe, war to be the greatest evil)
is intolerable.
I fervently wish, my anticipations may not be
verifyed [sic] the prostration of national honor,
national degredation. . . . Nothing has transpired to Justify a conclusion that our enemies
are disposed to relax, consequently we will have
to obscure the neck, or fight--I wish a little
of the fire of 76 could be infused in Congress-imbecile measures will not do much longer something must be adopted, to run us up together, we
are too much divided, a small struggle would do
it •61
Richard M. Johnson, Desha's Kentucky colleague in the
House, further stated "If however G. Britain should take
[offense] at the dismissal of Jackson . .
probable we shall .
62
men of 76."

I think it

. act worthy the decendants of the

These same Kentuckians would join Clay in

the "War Hawk" Congress that convened in the winter of
1811. and declared war against Great Britain in the
following spring.

However, in the early months of 1810 the

Kentuckians were not yet ready to agitate for a declaration
of war.

Later events would push them further in that

direction.
Economic depression blamed on the British and French
commercial measures, the diplomatic insults of "Copenhagen"
Jackson and George Canning, the growing fear of national

61Joseph Desha to Joseph Hamilton Daveiss, Feb. 17.
1810, Daveiss Papers (The Filson Club).
62
Richard M. Johnson to Joseph Hamilton Daveiss, Feb.
20, 1810. ibid.
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humiliation over impressment, all added to the tension
created earlier by the Chesapeake Affair and postRevulation anti-British prejudices.

This situation was

heightened by the frustration that developed due to the
failure of the Congress to find an effective, pacific
solution to the problems with England.

Macon's Bill No

2

which opened American ports to English and French ships and
hoped for an end of English and French commercial restrictions was a symbol of this failure.

In the spring of 1810

most Kentuckians were not ready to call for a declaration
of war, but they were rapidly approaching the point of
being so.

The final cause would not necessarily have to be

a major incident, for the previous events had driven them
to the brink of belligerency.

Most Kentuckians were strong

anti-British, and seemed to be growing more so as time
passed.

With each ensuing incident the gravity of the

offence necessary to bring on a cry for war was diminished.

CHAPTER IV

TIPPECANOE AND WAR TOO
Following General "Mad Anthony" Wayne's victory over
the western Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794
and the subsequent Treaty of Greenville, the Indian menace
in the Ohio Vplley was greatly suppressed.

At Greenville

the Indians ceded lands to the whites which allowed for
uncontested expansion of settlers into much of Ohio and
southeastern Indiana, creating a situation of which the
frontiersmen quickly took advantage.'

By 1803, barely

eight years following the Battle of Fallen Timbers, the
Ohio territory was settled and admitted to statehood.

By the

early years of the nineteenth century, the frontiersmen
began to apply pressure to the Indian tribes on the lands
west of the Ohio country.

As settlers continued to move

into the Indiana Territory, chances of warfare between the
Indians and whites increased.

This possibility was

enhanced by the appearance of a strong chief who offered
resistance to the encroachment of the white man, the

1The lands ceded to the United States by the Treaty of
Greenville can be identified in Charles C. Royce, Indian
Land Cessions in the United States (Washington, 1965)7-654-57, and maps 17-20, 29, 49-50.
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Shawnee Tecumseh.

In Tecumseh the Indians found a leader

around whom they could rally to defend their lands against
the invaders.
Tecumseh, although not technically a chief, emerged as
a leader of his people because of his intelligence and
courage in battle.

Tecumseh had probably fought at Fallen

Timbers as a young man, and he realized the organized power
of the settlers and the troops.

To offset the power of the

whites, Tecumseh proposed an Indian confederation in the
West to keep Indian lands from falling into the hands of
the whites.

He advocated a form of Indian nationalism, and

urged a return to the old ways of the Indians--a life-style
uncorrupted by the white man.

In advocating unity and

purity, Tecumseh was aided by his brother, Elkswatawa,
better known as The Prophet.

The Prophet believed himself

to be supernatural, and, because of his visions, he became
a leader of a large group of Indians of many different
tribes.

The Prophet told the Indians that two separate

spirits had created white men and Indians, and the creator
of the Indians was angry with them.

The Prophet warned,

"He will destroy you unless you refrain from drunkenness,
lying, stealing and witchcraft, and turn yourselves to
him."

He inveighed against all aspects of the white man's
2
culture.

2
Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Field Book of the
War of 1812 (New York, 1869), 189.
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Because of his preachings, by 1808 The Prophet had
drawn a large number of followers to his town on the banks
of the Wabash River in the Indiana Territory, near its
junction with the Tippecanoe River.

The Prophet's Town (as

it became known to the whites) soon became a rallying point
for Indians from all over the old Northwest.3
Besides preaching a return to Indian customs, Tecumseh
and the Prophet began to argue that the lands inhabited by
the Indians belonged to all of the Indians rather than just
to those occupying the land

Because it belonged to all

the tribes, no single tribe could sell the land to the
whites.

Any sale would have to be approved by all the

tribes, an approval that would have been nearly impossible
4
to achieve.

It was in this manner that Tecumseh hoped to

stop the advance of the white men and preserve Indian
identity.

To achieve this goal, Tecumseh travelled north,

west and south to convince the Indians to form a confederation to stop the spread of American settlers.

Unlike King

Philip of the Wampanoags or Pontiac, Tecumseh did not
propose stopping the white man by force; rather, he
proposed simply to avoid selling lands for future expansion
to the whites.

Despite these high ideals, Tecumseh's plan

3Ibid., 190.
4Ibid.; Alec R. Gilpin, The War of 1812 in the Old
Northwest (East Lansing, Michigan, 1958), 5.
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was ill-fated from the beginning.

Even if he did not

propose war, many of his white opponents did.
Tecumseh's plan, even though peaceful in purpose,
began to alarm the whites.

Fear of a British inspired

Indian conspiracy was wide spread in the west, and, despite
the growing communities of Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio and
Indiana, few frontiersmen would be safe in a major British
supported Indian war.5

The disasters of St. Clair and

Harmar were still fresh in the minds of many westerners,
who. like Felix Grundy, could well remember the shriek of

5Although Louis Hacker, "Western Land Hunter." 372-74,
argues that the Indians were not a threat to white civilization in the Ohio Valley by 1810-1811 due to the rapid
growth of population in the region, it should be remembered
that the Indians were as much a psychological as a military
threat. Despite the fact that the frontiersmen outnumbered
the Indians in the west, few felt secure enough in their
homes to disregard totally the Indian as a threat. When
the war began, there were several instances of Indian
attacks upon settlements very close to the Kentucky border,
attacks that could easily have been directed against the
Kentucky settlements. Henry Clay tells of a massacre on
Silver Creek within 24 miles north of Louisville, Clay to
[James Monroe], Sept. 21. 1812, Hopkins and Hargraves,
eds., Clay Papers, I, 729. Another Kentuckian, Samuel
Goode Hopkins to Charles Scott, May 9, 1812, Richard C.
Knopf, ed., The National Intelligencer Reports the War of
1812 in the Northwest, Document Transcriptions of the War
of 1812 in the Northwest (6 vols., Columbus, Ohio, 1951-59).
V. pt. 1, 86-87, reported Indian hostilities just across
the Ohio from Henderson, Kentucky, and proposed that a
volunteer army be sent to aid Harrison, inasmuch as the
Ohio River was the only barrier to the "same ruthless
invasion" that the settlers in Indiana were experiencing.
Thomas E. Craig to Ninian Edwards, April 28, 1812, E. B.
Washburne. ed., The Edwards Papers (Chicago, 1884), 69,
reported that an Indian attack on the Ohio River just below
the mouth of the Green River killed three whites in the
spring of 1812.
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the savage and the threat of the scalping knife.

To such

6
people, old fears did not disappear suddenly.
It was with growing anxiety that Kentuckians viewed
the growing belligerency of the Indians congregated at
Prophet's Town.

In the spring of 1810, the Indians refused

the "annuity salt" provided them.

In order to preserve

peace, Indiana territorial Governor William Henry Harrison
invited Tecumseh to the territorial capital at Vincennes to
discuss the situation.

Tecumseh accepted the offer and

arrived at Vincennes on August 12, 1810 at the head of four
hundred warriors rather than the thirty that Harrison had
7
expected.

This influx greatly upset the citizens of

Vincennes.

After the hastened conclusion of the council, a

council that was marked by the belligerent words and
actions of both Harrison and Tecumseh,Harrison increased
the training of the militia and requested the assignment of
a detachment of regulars under his command.8
In the spring of 1811, Indian raids against both white
settlers and Indians friendly to the whites began to
increase in the vicinity of Prophet's Town.

This increased

6Grundy is quoted in Coleman, "Ohio Valley
Preliminaries," 43.
7
Lossing, Field Book 1812, 191.
8

191-93; McAfee, War Western Country, 13.

81
activity created general alarm in the Indiana territory.9
In response Harrison threatened to attack the Indian
settlements if Tecumseh and The Prophet did not restrain
from attacking the settlers and their allies.

Tecumseh had

planned to postpone any conflict with the whites until he
had amassed a sufficiently strong confederation of western
tribes or until the expected war between England and the
United States should begin.10

Therefore Tecumseh agreed to

meet with Harrison to discuss a possible reconciliation.
On July 27, 1811, Tecumseh preceded with three hundred
Indians to Vincennes.

In this case, however, much of the

citizens' alarm was reduced by the presence of eight
hundred militiamen.

Tecumseh professed his friendliness to

the whites but refused to turn over two Indians who were
accused of committing murder in Missouri.

Tecumseh wanted

to discuss the Fort Wayne Treaty which had ceded Indian
lands to the United States, but Harrison refused, saying
that the treaty was now out of his power and in the hands

9Lossing, Field Book 1812, 193; McAfee, War Western
Country, 15; W. A. Wentworth, "Tippecanoe and Kentucky
Too," Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 60
(January 1962), 37.
10Lossing, Field Book 1812, 193: McAfee, War Western
Country, 15; Gilpin, War in the Northwest, 6; Anonymous,
The Life of Major General William Henry Harrison. . . .
(Philadelphia, 1840), 25.
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of the President.

The Council of 1811 adjourned with

little accomplished.

11

Following this Council, Tecumseh took a small party of
warriors into the southern Indian territories to argue in
behalf of his proposed Indian confederation.

He was thus

out of the vicinity when the next phase of the conflict
began.12
The citizens of Vincennes believed that the Indian
confederation already existed and thought that the Northwest territory was in grave danger from Indian attack.13
Fearful of such an occurrence and believing war between the
Indians and the whites to be inevitable, Harrison decided
to take the offensive in Tecumseh's absence.

He began to

plan an attack against Prophet's Town.14
Harrison proposed an ultimatum demanding the surrender
of the murderers and barring all hostile Indians from
passing through friendly Indian lands.

He then would

notify the friendly Indians that the Americans considered

1'Gilpin, War in the
Northwest, 6-7; Harrison to
William Eustis, August 6, 1811, in Logan Esarey, ed.,
Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison (2 vols.,
Indianapolis, 1922), I, 542-46.
12Lossing, Field Book 1812, 193.
13
Petition to James Madison, President of the United
States, July 31, 1811, Esarey, ed., Messages and Letters of
Harrison, I. 538-40; "Resolutions Concerning Indians."
July 31, 1811, ibid.. 540-41.
14Gilpin,
War in the Northwest. 8.
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the Indians supporting The Prophet hostile; they were not
to be given sanctuary.

He then began to gather regular

troops from Vincennes and Fort Knox, as well as militia
from Kentucky and Indiana. to proceed against the Indians
if necessary.
Harrison was joined by many Kentucky volunteers after
gaining the support of Governor Charles Scott.

Among those

volunteering were many prominent citizens of the state
including Joseph Hamilton Daviess, Abraham Owen, and
Frederick Geiger. 15

Some came for possible military glory.

but many others came because of the threat of the Indians
to the Western country.
Throughout the preparations for the campaign Harrison
had been in communication with Secretary of War. William
Eustis. and on October 12, 1811, Harrison finally received
orders for the campaign from Eustis.

They stated that The

Prophet should be encouraged to disband his followers
peacefully and Harrison should accept hostages to insure
peacefulness of the Indians.

If The Prophet refused, then

the Indians were to be routed; The Prophet was to be taken
prisoner, and the settlement destroyed.

Harrison was

authorized to go beyond these orders if he felt it
necessary.

le

15 Ibid.. 8-10.
16Ibid.. 13.
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By November 6 the army had advanced to within two
miles of Prophet's Town without meeting any hostile action
by the Indians.

Harrison was given a camp site near the

town by the Indians and promises were exchanged by the
whites and the Indians that battle would not begin until
17
after talks between the leaders.
Despite his assurances, The Prophet decided to attack
the army during the early morning hours of November 7,
1811.

The Indian attack, in what became known as the

Battle of Tippecanoe, came just before the army was aroused
at 4:00 a.m., and caught the whites partially unprepared.
Aided by the glare of the huge campfires built by the whites
to protect them from the cold fall night, the Indians took
an early advantage in the fighting.

The Prophet had told

his men that he would cast a spell whereby the bullets of
the white men would not be able to penetrate the skin of
18
This
the Indians and their powder would turn to sand.
promise may have accounted for some of the foolish courage
displayed by the Indians.

When daylight came, however, the

advantage enjoyea by the Indians began to fade as
Harrison's infantry and cavalry could now see to charge.
The whites drove the Indians from the camp, thus bringing
the Battle of Tippecanoe to its conclusion after two hours

17

Ib1d., 15-16.

18
McAfee, War Western Country, 31.
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of fighting.

Although Harrison had repulsed the enemy

attack, he had not really routed the Indians.

During the

day the men cared for their dead and wounded and prepared
defensive positions to ward off any further attacks by the
Indians.

Supplies were low and it was rumored that a major

force under command of Tecumseh was advancing to the
field.

19

On November 8, a small cavalry detail scouted

Prophet's Town and found it deserted.
and the town was then burned.

Supplies were taken

With this action completed,

Harrison's army began its long march back to Vincennes.
Following the Battle of Tippecanoe, Indian depredations increased on the frontier to a new peak, but by the
spring of 1812, Tecumseh's goal of organizing an Indian
confederacy of the west was damaged if not destroyed.
Tecumseh had urged The Prophet to remain peaceful until
Tecumseh's return, and the failure to destroy Harrison's
army at Tippecanoe discredited The Prophet in most Indian
eyes, making many tribes reluctant to join his confederation.

And the battle had caused the destruction of

19According to Gilpin, War in the Northwest, 16-19, of
1000 whites at the battle 62 died before November 18, 1811
and 126 more were wounded. There were from 500 to 800
Indians at the battle and 40 dead were found on the battle
ground, although the Indians carried off many dead and
wounded during the battle. Harrison's account of the
battle can be found in Harrison to Eustis, November 18,
1811, Esarey. ed.. Messages and Letters of Harrison, I.
618-31.
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Prophet's Town and the death of many of Tecumseh's bravest
followers

20

The major result, however, of the battle was not
military but psychological.

The Indians were found to be

using rifles and powder supplied from the British fort at
Malden.

Always suspicious of British-Indian collusion in

the west, Kentuckians responded to the news with renewed
hatred for the British and the Indians.

Following the

Battle of Tippecanoe, westerners began to agitate fiercely
once again for war with England and her Indian allies.

The

relative passiveness of 1809 and 1810 turned to bitter
hostility in 1811, and many westerners looked to war with
England with enthusiasm as the only means of solving the
Indian problem.21

As one historian has noted, "The

impressment of American seamen, they [Kentuckians] resented

20
McAfee, War Western Country, 17, 41; Joe C. Creason,
"The Battle of Tippecanoe, November 7, 1811," The Filson
Club History Quarterly, XXXVI (Oct. 1962), 310. According
to Creason The Prophet may have been a good prophet after
all. He correctly predicted a comet which appeared before
and during the battle, and further, he said that if the
Indians did not drive the whites from the land then the
earth would shake and uproot trees. One month after
Tippecanoe, and on the very night after the comet
disappeared, there was a great earthquake and trees were
uprooted. The floor of the Mississippi River buckled.
forcing it to flow upstream briefly. This was the New
Madrid quake which, according to Creason, is "regarded as
the most severe earthquake of recorded time."
21

Anonymous, Life of Harrison, 25. Isaac Barker in
Lexington reported to a friend that "there is a great buzz
of war here. . . .." Barker to Isaac R. Gwathmey, April 3,
1812, Gwathmey Family Papers (The Filson Club).
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as an act insulting to their nation; the capture of
American trading vessels, they regarded as 'Piracy'; but
,,22
the inciting of savages was war.
When news of the battle reached Kentucky most people
were outraged.

Westerners had suspected an Indian-British

alliance for some time and Tippecanoe seemed to confirm
23
this suspicion.

Many newspapers in the state immediately

linked the Indian warfare with other British hostilities.
The Kentucky Gazette stated on November 19, 1811 in an
article entitled "British-Savage War!" that
. . . war we now have; and when we consider that
the blow is struck in the Western woods at the
same moment that Great Britain is sweeping our
vessels off the ocean, and her minister is making
demands, which he knows can not possibly be
indulged or acceded to, we can not but consider
these events as proceeding from one common

22McElroy, Kentucky in Nation's History, 328.
23
John Melish, Travels Through the United States.
II, 177, reported that while in Louisville in September
1811 his fellow travellers believed "that there was unquestionable evidence of the Indians being stirred up by the
British, and I found this to be the current belief here,
. . . The Lexington Reporter of Nov. 2. 1811, quoted in
Hacker, "Land Hunger." 381, stated that "the whole merit of
stirring up Indians and all their dreadful warfare on the
wives and children--blood, murder, and the tomahawk, are
monopolized solely by our friends at Malden. . . . We are
persuaded that the Indian war will be found to be really
British. The savages are only the allies of greater
savages," E. Cruikshank, "The Employment of Indians in the
War of 1812," 321-335. argues that in reality the British
officials in Canada attempted to avoid a confrontation
between the Americans and the Indians. Although the
British agents were certainly sumpathetic to the Indians,
they still hoped to avoid a conflict. It would have been
very difficult for the suspicious westerners to have
believed this.
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source--the English cabinet. Such has been her
career from the beginning of the Revolution to
this day; she has always been first to "light the
savage fire." The Indians are but her allies.
her agents. We hope, therefore to witness no
more protracted moderation against such inflexible hostility.24
Harrison further played upon the hostility felt by
many Kentuckians when he reported that
Within the last three months, the whole of the
Indians on this frontier, have been completely
armed and equipped out of the King's stores at
Malden. . . . The Indians had . . . an amply
[sic] supply of the best British glazed powder.
some of the guns had been sent to them so short
a time before the action, that they were not
divested of the list covering in which they are
imported.25
On November 27, 1811, Governor Charles Scott of Kentucky
declared in a letter to Harrison that the Indians were
urged on by the British.

26

This sentiment was repeated in

Scott's annual message to the Kentucky General Assembly
when he stated that
The Governor of the Indiana Territory, having
received orders to establish some posts on the
lands lately ceded by several Indian tribes up
the Wabash. was attacked treacherously on the
night of November last, by a large party of
Indians--when to the honor of our countrymen.
though taken under every disadvantage, and not

24
Kentucky Gazette. Nov. 19, 1811.
25Harrison to Colonel John M. Scott, December 2.
1811.
reprinted in Alfred Pirtle, The Battle of Tippecanoe
(Louisville. 1900). 100-01. Fort Malden was just across
the river from Detroit on Canadian soil.
26
Charles Scott to Harrison. November 27, 1811,
Esarey, ed.. Messages and Letters of Harrison. I. 653.
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superior in number, the enemy was repulsed on a
hard fought field, with the loss, however, which
is deeply to be regreeted of a number of
valuable lives. It is not to be believed that
these Savages would contend, single handed, with
the force of the United States, which they well
know could crush them at a blow.--The hand of the
British intrigue is not difficult to be perceived in this thing--The movements of the
Savages in that quarter have indicated it for
some time past. This, we have reason to believe,
is only the precurser of a more weighty conflict:
Let us, therefore, be prepared for the
encounter.27
He added in a call for volunteers, dated May 5, 1812,
that "there is but little doubt, that war at this moment
28
exists, and may be regarded as inevitable."
The Lexington Reporter echoed and intensified this
sentiment by proclaiming that "War on the Wabash is purely
British. . . . The British scalping knife has filled many
habitations both in this state as well as in the Indiana
29
Territory with widows and orphans."

Although the British

depredations in the west did not affect commerce or
industry, it did involve something "ten thousand times more
valuable.

. . The lives of women and children on the

frontiers are at stake, and the settlement of the western
territories is deeply

27

involved."30

Thus to the editor of

Journal, Kentucky House, 1811. 8-12.

281,Address of Governor Scott to the Freemen of
Kentucky," May 5, 1812, Knopf, Documents of the War in the
Northwest. V. pt. 1. 73-74.
29Quoted in Mayo, Clay. 398.
30
Ibid.
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the Lexington Reporter, the British responsibility for
Tippecanoe was tied inseparably to the other British outrages of the previous decade.
The Kentucky General Assembly echoed this belligerency
by offering a resolution which denounced British encroachThe legislature stated tnat public sentiment

ments.

demanded that the country
. . . resist the repeated. long continued and
flagrant violations of our rights as a free and
independent nation, by Great Britain and France-and by the former especially; whose pretentions
are an insult to our sovereignty; and which, if
yielded to, must end in our entire submission to
whatever they may think proper to impose. .
Forbearance beyond a certain point ceases to be
moderation; and must end in entire subjection.
. . . Should we tamely submit, the world ought
to despise us. We should despise ourselves.31
Isaac Shelby believed that the Indians were being
stirred up by the British and that the former were anxious
to "extend their savage and barbarous devastations along
the entire frontier.

u32

To alleviate this problem.

many westerners proposed that Canada be conquered to end
the British intrigue with the Indians.

The Kentucky

Gazette of April 14. 1812 saw this as a possible solution
to the Indian problem. and warned that "Until those
civilized allies of our savage neighbors are expelled from

31

Acts, 1811, 252-54.

32

Isaac Shelby to William Eustis Sept. 5, 1812. W. M.
Longnoor (comp.). "Correspondence of Governor Isaac
Shelby." The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society.
VII (Jan. 1910). 107.
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our continent, we must expect the frequent occurrence of
the late scenes on the Wabash."

Henry Clay said in

Congress that under current conditions the invasion of a
foreign nation would not be an offensive war, but, rather.
an attempt to wage an effective defensive war.

The goal

was to drive the British from Canada to end British interference with the Indians living in United States' territory,
not to take virgin Canadian lands for future cultivation by
the people of the United States.

The proposed American

invasion of Canada was not to be an end in itself; it was
to be the means to a more important end--the termination of
the Indian threat in the Northwest territory.33
To the westerners, the British obviously were responsible for Tippecanoe.

However, Tippecanoe was more than

simply one more British attack upon American patience; it
was a direct threat to the life and security of many

33
Kentucky Gazette, April 14, 1812; Speech Supporting
Bill to Raise Volunteers, Jan. 11, 1812, Hopkins and
Hargraves, eds., Clay Papers, I, 613-14; Pratt, "Western
War Aims," 41, 45. This is in marked contrast with the
interpretations advanced by Hacker, "Western Land Hunger";
Howard T. Lewis. "A Re-Analysis of the Causes of the War of
1812," Americana, VI (1911), 506-16, 577-85; and Ellery L.
Hall, "Canadian Annexation Sentiment in Kentucky Prior to
the War of 1812," Register of the Kentucky Historical
Society, XXVIII (Oct. 1930), 372-80. It is Hacker, Lewis
and Hall's contention that the declaration of war was
forced through Congress by the West so that the rich
Canadian lands could be opened to the frontiersmen who were
rapidly wearing out the lands of the Mississippi and Ohio
Valleys. The complaints of Indian atrocities, impressments
and ship seizures were only rhetoric designed to achieve the
westerners' more selfish goals. The best repudiation of
this thesis can be found in Pratt, "Western War Aims."

92
westerners.

Tippecanoe joined impressment, ship seizures,

the Chesapeake Affair, British-blamed depression in the
west, and the Anglo-phobia remaining since the Revolutionary struggle to produce open hostility.

The open

belligerency expressed following the Chesapeake Affair
had slowly receded as Jefferson and Madison attempted to
alleviate the problems existing with the British through
diplomatic and commercial measures, but the Battle of
Tippecanoe coincided with the admitted failures of economic
coercion and produced increased hostility toward the
British.
To many Kentuckians Tippecanoe was the opening blow in
the inevitable struggle between the British and the
34
Americans.

A Kentuckian writing to the Philadelphia

Aurora, in a letter dated December 14, 1811,stated that
"Upon our frontier the work of blood has commenced.
After this, will any doubt?

Will any waver? . . . Whoever

"35
hesitates may be set down to George III.

War existed on

the western frontier and even though no British soldiers

34McAfee, War Western Country, 8; Creason, "Tippecanoe," 301; James Taylor, Sr., to James Taylor, Jr., May
12, 1812, James Taylor Papers (The Filson Club). Taylor
Sr., recognized war with the Indians existed and that war
with the British was probable, although he did not see it
as inevitable. John Pintard still hoped for "an adjustment
of our dispute with England" even at that late date; John
Pintard to Mrs. Richard Davidson, Dec. 11, 1912,
Miscellaneous Papers (The Filson Club).
35
Quoted in Mayo, Clay, 397.
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were present, the frontiersman truly believed that the
British were responsible and that the Indians were only
their "hired assassins."
For most Kentuckians, it was now only necessary for
the Congress to declare war on the British.

Although a few

people in Kentucky would oppose war measures (such as John
Pope who voted against the war declaration in the Senate),
36
the great majority of the people desired such action.
When war became a probability, former Governor Isaac
Shelby, hero of the battle of Kings

Mountain in the

Revolution, was called out of retirement to lead the state
in "those times of danger and peril. . . .

Many

Kentuckians, knowing a war was coming, wanted to have a
37
proven warrior as Governor.
The Battle of Tippecanoe has been suggested to have
been a clash between civilization and savagery, and a

36
Coulter, "Prologue" to Clift, Raisin, 27. Pope's
actions are discussed in Orval W. Baylor, "The Life and
Times of John Pope, 1770-1845," Filson Club History
Quarterly. IV (April 1941), 62, and Orval W. Baylor, John
Pope, Kentuckian (Cynthiana, Kentucky, 1943). 83-94.
Neither of these accounts gives much insight into Pope's
reasons for voting against the war. Baylor suggests that
Pope's former Federalism may have been the cause, or.
perhaps more realistically, his fear that the nation was
not prepared in 1812 to fight a war against the British.
Pope, himself, offered yet another explanation in a letter
to his nephew. Pope to Ninian Edwards. Nov. 9, 1809.
Washburne, ed., Edwards Papers. 36-41. Pope seemed to be
generally anti-war and saw little good to come from wars.
37Jno. Monroe to Col. Isaac Shelby, June 8, 1812.
Isaac Shelby Papers: Isaac L. Barker to Isaac R. Gwathmey,
March 31, 1812, Gwathmey Family Papers.
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struggle over who should take advantage of the western
38
The battle. because of the
lands, but it was more.
supposed British support of the Indians. was the event that
brought war to the western country.

Grievances had been

building and all that was required was a spark and war
finally came to the west.
Congress would then decide if Britain should be
officially fought along with the Indians, since the evidence was abundant that the British were being fought
unofficially.

In either case. Kentuckians were prepared

psychologically and had expressed their desire for war.
The final decision was made in Congress. perhaps for far
different reasons than those expressed by the people of
Kentucky.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
War was finally declared by Congress against Britain
on June 18, 1812.

Although several Kentuckians played

important roles in the passing of the war measure, they may
or may not have been acting with motives consistent with
the motives of Kentuckians in general.

To many

Kentuckians, Congress was only admitting the inevitable
since the Battle of Tippecanoe showed that war existed
between the westerners and the British and Indians.
Roger H. Brown has suggested that war between England
and the United States in 1812 came because of national
political considerations which is beyond the scope of this
study.

Fearful that public unrest would lead to their

defeat in the election of 1812, the Republicans went to war
in 1812 to save, at least in their minds, republican government in the country, by eliminating the means by which the
Federalists could win control.

Brown, however, is more

concerned with the effect of the unrest than with the
unrest itself.
The causes of the unrest have been studied by various
historians for many years.

Some have argued that war was
95
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desired because of the British insults to the national
honor through impressment, ship seizures, and the
Chesapeake Affair, as well as the diplomatically insulting
Erskine and Jackson affairs.

Westerners, as impetuous

frontiersmen, supposedly perceived these insults more
readily than did their "civilized" eastern brethren.
Furthermore, according to this interpretation, the
westerners wanted to handle the insults in a frontier
manner, i.e. by resorting to violent means to right the
insult.

This would explain the westerners' desire for war

as opposed to the easterners' reluctance to fight.
Other historians have seen land-hunger for Canadian
lands as the central theme, while others claim that the
desire to control the fur trade and to exterminate the
Indian as a dangerous threat was the primary cause of the
conflict.

Still other historians have claimed that a

southern and western depression from 1805 to 1812 was
blamed on British actions, and that the economic hardship
created by this depression caused the people to desire war
to end the British activities and thus restore prosperity.
In such a maze of interpretation. Kentucky can be used as a
test case to examine the causes of public unrest.
In Kentucky, as shown previously, almost all of these
elements arose, making one speculate that perhaps all of
the explanations for the causes of the war are correct.
seems that fear of a loss of national honor. discontent

It
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over failing economic conditions blamed on the British, and
fear and outrage over the supposed British-inspired Indian
confederacy on American soil as shown by the Battle of
Tippecanoe, combined with the anti-British attitude coming
out of the American Revolution to produce a deeply
perceived feeling of being wronged in the minds of many
Kentuckians.
Attempts by the government to end these British wrongs
failed, leaving by 1812 no alternative but a declaration of
war.

Grievances had to be settled, and by 1812 few

Kentuckians who perceived the damage being done by the
British could offer any other course of action.
Seen in this light, Kentuckians' desire for war was
the culmination of a long series of insults and injuries at
the hands of the British.

Although war was desired at

various stages along the chain of wrongs, it was the
additive effect which eventually produced the public unrest
which drove the Congress to declare war.

By 1812, to many

Kentuckians a declaration of war was the only course of
action that promised any success in solving the problems
which confronted them.
In such an interpretation, the statements made by such
Kentuckians as Governor Charles Scott and George Washington
Cooke and the Kentucky General Assembly emerge as more than
mere rhetoric.

Instead of simply listing abuses in order

to justify their selfish actions, these detailed
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explanations for belligerency may be viewed as being an
accurate listing of the causes which drove them to desire
war.
Governor Scott stated that
The moment has arrived when we are called on by
the general government to contribute our proportion of men, to meet the approaching contest with
G. Britain. There is but little doubt, that war
at this moment exists, and may be regarded as
inevitable. . .
The events which have led to the present crisis
in our affairs are known to all. To recapitulate the wrongs we have so long borne from the
British government, is almost to record our own
infamy. They are to be found in the blood of our
slaughtered unoffending brethren; in the groans
and stripes of thousands of our countrymen.
impressed and confined at this moment in the
floating dungeons; forced to turn their arms
against the country which gave them birth and
friends and relatives dear to their hearts. To
an unblushing claim, avowed and enforced, to take
our vessels and property wherever found, when
destined to a power on amity with us, which she
In compelling us
may please to be at war with.
will
us to trade
permit
she
before
tax
to pay a
to her
licenses
she
grants
when
enemy.
with her
free
enemy
that
very
with
trade
own subjects, to
her
us
force
of
to
demanding
of expense. In
enemy to receive her manufactures. The measure
of our wrongs is filled up by every wanton insult
which she can offer in our own ports, and finally
has overflowed by her placing the scalping knife
and tomahawk in the hands of the Indians on our
frontiers, who are daily murdering our peaceful
citizens and defenceless women and children.1
Echoing the multiplicity of reasons for war was George
Washington Cooke. speaking before a gathering in Montgomery

Address of Gov. Scott to the Freemen of Kentucky. May
5, l812, Knopf. ed.. Documents of the War in the Northwest.
V. pt. 1, 73-74.
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County.

Cooke said that "England has violated her neutral

Rights.

Seized and plundered our Vessels, and illegally

condemned them as lawful prizes--Neither can I overlook the
impressment of our fellow citizens and Seamen.

11

Furthermore, England had violated the rights of the Americans "to trade and carry our produce where ever we please."
Cooke's greatest invective was aimed, however, at the
British intrigue among the Indians.

"The British have

hyred the Savages on the Habitants of our frontier, and
massacreed innocent and defenceless families . . . we are
filled with indignation."

After recounting the Indian

atrocities on the frontier, Cooke concluded that "we must
again Scourge the British Bloodhounds, and Repel Savage
,2
Barbarity.
The General Assembly stated that the crisis in the
public affairs of the nation was brought about by "the
repeated, long continued and flagrant violations of our
rights as a free and independant nation . . . and which, if
yielded to must end in our entire submission. .

."

These

violations were then summed up by the legislature when it
stated that
. . we have discovered a systematic course of
injury from her [Britain] toward our country.

2An Oration Delivered by George Washington Cooke .
14 day of May 1812, Kentucky Manuscripts, Draper Collection, 5CC33 The State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
Madison, Wisconsin).
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evidencing too strongly to be mistaken, an utter
disregard of almost every principle of acknowledged right between independent nations;
endeavoring by almost every act of violence on
the high seas; on the coasts of foreign powers
with whom we were in amity; and even in sight of
our own harbors, by capturing and destroying our
vessels; confiscating our property; forcibly
imprisoning and torturing our fellow citizens;
condemning some to death; slaughtering others, by
attacking our ships of war. Impressing our seamen to man her vessels; bidding defiance to our
seaports; insulting our national honor by every
means that lawless force can devise; inciting the
savages (as we have strong reason to believe) to
murder the inhabitants on our defenseless
frontiers; furnishing them with arms & ammunition
lately to attack our forces, to the loss of a
number of our brave men; and by every act of
power and intrigue, seeking to dispose of our
whole strength and resources, as may suit her
unrestrained ambition or interest. . . .3
The causes of belligerency in Kentucky were far too
complex to be limited to one factor.

"War fever" in

Kentucky was created not by any single incident or situation such as impressment, ship seizures, the Chesapeake
Affair, economic depression, land hunger, or fear of an
Indian confederation; rather, it came because of the
cumulative effect of these problems.

War was desired in

1812 because all pacific attempts to alleviate the problem
had failed and war appeared to be the only alternative that
offered any solution.

The importance of a solution was

evident to the General Assembly when it stated that

"For-

bearance beyond a certain point, ceases to be moderation;

Resolution of Foreign Affairs," January 13, 1812,
Acts, 1811. 252-54.
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and must end in entire subjection."4

With all pacific

means exhausted by 1812, the resistance to subjection
thereafter would take the form of "a Flaming Sword .
unsheathed and nothing to appease its wrath, or cool its
Rage but British blood."5

For these reasons, many

Kentuckians in public and private life were satisfied to
find war declared against the British in 1812, which
resulted in the end of unredressed insults and injuries.

4Ibid.
5Oration by George Washington Cooke, Draper Collection,
5 CC 33.
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PRIMARY AND CONTEMPORARY SOURCES

A.

Newspaper Sources
The most valuable single source used in this study was

the Kentucky Gazette for the period 1803-1812.

The Gazette

was a weekly publication printed in Lexington by John
Bradford, and was very much a Republican party newspaper.
As events escalated, the Gazette became more belligerent
toward the British.

A second newspaper urging for war,

perhaps earlier and more emphatically than the Gazette,was
the Lexington Reporter.

The Reporter was valuable for this

study from its first issue, published in 1808, to the
coming of the war in 1812.
One of the more interesting newspaper sources was The
American Republic published in Frankfort by Humphrey
Marshall from 1810 to 1812.

Marshall was probably the most

outspoken Federalist in the state, if not the most
influential.

The American Republic constantly leveled

attacks against both Democratic politicians and Napoleonic
France.

One must question exactly how much influence such

a paper had among the great majority of the citizens of the
state, but it definitely represented a vocal minority of
Kentuckians.
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There were also other Kentucky newspapers that were
useful, but not available in complete file through this
period.

They were:

The Weekly Messenger and The Dove

published in Washington, Kentucky; The Candid Review
published in Bardstown; The Western Citizen published in
Although

Paris; and The Informant published in Danville.

long runs of these papers were not available for examination, individual, scattered issues were helpful.
An interesting and useful source was a collection of
newspaper reports assembled by Richard C. Knopf, ed., The
National Intellegencer Reports the Thar of 1812 in the
Northwest (Columbus, Ohio, 1957-1959), 6 vols.

The

National Intellegencer published in Washington, D. C. was
the semi-official paper of the Madison administration.

The

accounts of events concerning Tippecanoe and much of the
correspondence between principal figures in that conflict
were published by the Intellegencer.

Despite the obvious

political bias, the collection was valuable in finding the
statements of the people involved as well as in seeing the
type of news concerning Tippecanoe reaching the people of
Kentucky.

B.

Legislative Documents
Publications issued by the government of Kentucky

during the period 1803-1812 were of two general types.

The

first type was the legislative journals of thc annual
meetings of the Kentucky House of Representatives and the
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Kentucky Senate which contained the official business of
the General Assembly.

Although these journals do not

contain the debates carried on by the members of the legislature, they do contain the votes and bills proposed, and
the annual messages of the governor on the problems he saw
facing the state.

These journals are published under the

general titles of Journal of the House of Representatives
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky . . . and Journal of the
Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. .

.

The journals

appeared annually and were printed in Frankfort.

The

annual legislative session usually began late in the year
and the Journal was printed early in the next year.
Because of this, the Journal for the session beginning, for
example, in December 1811 should have been printed and
dated in 1812.

However, perhaps through oversight, some of

the Journals have printing dates which would imply that the
Journal was published midway through the session, which was
not the case.

Although this was a minor error, it was an

irritation in finding the desired Journals.
The second type of state publication of the Commonwealth was a collection of the legislative actions published
under the general title Acts Passed at the . . . Session of
the . . . General Assembly for the Commonwealth of Kentucky
• •

., which appeared annually.

These were very beneficial

in locating certain anti-British legislation and also
helpful in that the General Assembly attempted to influence
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the actions of the national government through passing
resolutions directed against the belligerents.

These

resolutions passed by the General Assembly are perhaps
illustrations of public opinion, however, as with newspaper
articles, the validity of this assumption may be questioned.
Closely related to the Acts was William Littell, The
Statute Law of Kentucky with Notes, Practections and
Observations on the Public Acts (Frankfort, 1811), 3 vols.,
a collection of the laws of Kentucky.

Although it was

similar to the Acts, it was much better organized and
therefore easier to use.
Somewhat less important were the debates of the United
States Congress which were published under the title, The
Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United
States. .

.

of Congress.

These are commonly referred to as the Annals
The Annals were examined sporadically for the

period 1803-1812, and were of some help.

C.

Private Correspondence
The private and public papers of many leading men

concerned with the history of Kentucky have been collected
and published in the last few years and provide valuable
sources to understanding this period.

The most useful of

these sources was James F. Hopkins and W. M. Hargraves,
eds., Papers of Henry Clay (Lexington, 1959to date.

), 4 vols.

During this period Clay was one of the leading

Republicans in the state andserved in the General Assembly,
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United States Senate and was Speaker of the national House
of Representatives, where he became one of the leading "war
hawks" in the Twelfth Congress of 1811-1812.

Volume I

contains most of the pertinent information for the period
under study.
Isaac Shelby, the hero of the battle of Kings Mountain
and the first governor of Kentucky, was elected governor
for a second term in 1811 when war seemed evident.

Some of

his papers can be found in W. W. Longmoor, ed., "Correspondence of Governor Isaac Shelby." Register of the Kentucky
Historical Society, 8 (Jan. 1910). 105-11, (May 1910), 1520, (Sept. 1910), 23-26 and ibid., 9 (Jan. 1911), 57-63,
and in the Isaac Shelby Papers (The Filson Club,
Louisville, Kentucky).
Papers of many other prominent men give insight into
the growing anti-British attitudes.
spondence can be found in:

Much of their corre-

James A. Padgett, ed., "The

Letters of Colonel Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky," The
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 38 (July
1940), 186-201, (Oct. 1940). 323-39, and ibid., 40 (April
1942), 91; Logan Esarey, ed., Messages and Letters of
William Henry Harrison (Indianapolis, 1922), 2 vols.; James
A. Padgett, ed., "Letters of James Taylor to the Presidents
of the United States," Register of the Kentucky Historical
Society, 34 (April 1936), 103-30, (July 1936), 251-78,
(Oct. 1936), 318-46: H. A. Washington, ed., The Writings of
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Thomas Jefferson (Washington, 1854), 9 vols.; and A. E.
Burgh and A. A. Lipscomb, eds., The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson (Washington, 1903), 20 vols.

Some interesting

letters of John Pope, Kentucky Senator who voted against
the war declaration in 1812, can be found in E. B.
Washburn, ed., The Edwards Papers . . . (Chicago, 1884).
Edwards was governor of the Illinois Territory and a nephew
of Pope.
Another interesting source was the exchange between
Commodore James Barron, commander of the Chesapeake, and
S. P. Humphreys, commander of the British ship Leopard.
These exchanges during the incident and Barron's subsequent
report can be found in Americanization Department, Veterans
of Foreign Wars of the United States, America:

Great

Crisis In Our History Told by Its Makers (Chicago, 1925),
20 vols.
Many manuscript collections were examined which helped
to assess the temper of the times although some were not
cited in the text.

The more valuable were:

The Joseph

Hamilton Daveiss and Samuel Daveiss Papers, 1786-1855 (The
Filson Club); Samuel McDowell Letters to Andrew Reid, 17831814 (The Filson Club); Gwathmey Family Papers, 1811-1902
(The Filson Club); John Pintard to Mrs. Richard Davidsol.
December 11, 1811, Miscellaneous Papers (The Filson Club);
Letters of James Taylor (Kentucky State Historical Society,
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Frankfort); and Robert Breckenridge McAfee, Journal, 18031807 (The Filson Club).

D.

Pamphlets and Contemporary Accounts
Robert B. McAfee also provided a very enlightening

contemporary account of the events leading to war in
History of the Late War in the Western Country (Lexington,
1816).

McAfee participated in the Western war and offers

perceptive insight into the cause of belligerency in the
West.
Further insight into the conditions in Kentucky prior
to the war can be found in John Melish, Travels Through the
United States of North America in the Years 1806 and 1807
and 1809, 1810 and 1811 (Philadelphia, 1812) 2 vols.

Melish

was a British citizen who passed through Kentucky late in
1811 at the time of the Battle of Tippecanoe.
Although the Federalist party did not have a strong
organization in Kentucky prior to the war there were many
men who were in opposition to the majority party.

Their

position was presented by their most vocal spokesman,
Humphrey Marshall. The History of Kentucky (Frankfort.
1824).
Few pamphlets have survived from this period dealing
with Kentucky reaction to foreign affairs.

The most

interesting are entitled At a Meeting of the Citizens of
Franklin at the State House in Frankfort. on Friday the
24th of July. 1847. tor the ,purpose of taking into
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Consideration the depredations, insults and outrages
committed by British subjects, on the property, rights, and
[n.p., n.d.), and An

persons of American citizens .

Oration delivered by George Washington Cooke . . . 14 day
of May, 1812, Draper Collection (The State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin), 5CC33.

The

microfilm edition used was prepared by the University of
Chicago Department of Photoduplication.

The first pamphlet

tells of a protest meeting in regard to the Chesapeake
Affair.

The second is an attack upon British outrages

against the people of the United States in general and the
West in particular.

SECONDARY SOURCES

The causes of the war have been studied by historians
almost from the beginning of that struggle.

This topic has

been discussed fully by many historians although none has
centered his study

on Kentucky.

Despite this failure.

many historical interpretations of the events leading to
hostilities have pertinence to this thesis.

The best

survey of the literature up to 1941 is found in Warren H.
Goodman, "The Origins of the War of 1812:

A Changing

Interpretation," Mississippi Valley Historical Review.
XXVIII (Sept. 1941). 171-87.

Although Goodman's study is

somewhat dated, he provides a good starting point for study
in the era.
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Several interpretive studies were examined to see if
they shed any light on the situation in Kentucky.

These

studies provided factual material in many cases, but more
importantly, they helped explain some aspects of Kentucky's
actions as part of a larger process.
these interpretive studies were:
Republic in Peril:

The most valuable of

Roger H. Brown, The

1812 (New York, 1964): Louis M. Hacker,

"Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812:

A Conjecture,"

Mississippi Valley Historical Review, X (March 1924). 36595; Julius W. Pratt. The Expansionists of 1812 (New York.
1925), and "Western War Aims in the War of 1812,"
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, X (June 1925). 36-50:
George Rogers Taylor. "Prices in the Mississippi Valley
Preceding the War of 1812." Journal of Economic and Business History. III (Nov. 1930), 148-63, and "Agrarian
Discontent in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of
1812." Journal of Political Economy, XXXIX (Aug. 1931),
471-505: Norman K. Risjord, "1812:

Conservatives, War

Hawks and the Nation's Honor," William and Mary Quarterly.
3rd Series. XVIII (April 1961), 196-211; and A. L. Burt.
Great Britain, the United States and British North America
from the Revolution to the Establishment of After the War
of 1812 (New Haven. 1940).
Several studies supported these interpretations either
by expanding them, modifying them or testing them on a
specific locality.

These also gave factual material which
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was useful, but they also gave insight into the larger
picture.

The most important of these were:

Ellery L.

Hall, "Canadian Annexation Sentiment in Kentucky Prior to
the War of 1812," Register of the Kentucky Historical
Society, 28 (Oct. 1930), 372-80; Margaret K. Latimer,
"South Carolina Protagonist of the War of 1812," American
Historical Review, LXI (July 1955), 914-30; Bradford
Perkins, Prologue to War; England and the United States,
1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961); Reginald Horsman, The Causes of
the War of 1812 (Philadelphia, 1962), and "Who Were the War
Hawks," Indiana Magazine of History, LX (June 1964); Roger
Brown, "The War Hawks of 1812, An Historical Myth," Indiana
Magazine of History, LX (June 1964); Irving Brant, James
Madison:

the President, 1809-1812 (Indianapolis, 1956),

and The Fourth President - A Life of James Madison
(Indianapolis, 1970); Victor A. Sapio, Pennsylvania and the
War of 1812 (Lexington, 1970); Ronald L. Hatzenbuehler,
"Party Unity and the Decision for War in the House of
Representatives. 1812," William and Mary Quarterly. 3rd
Series, XXIX (July 1972), 367-90; Christopher B. Coleman,
"The Ohio Valley in the Preliminaries of the War of 1812,"
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VII (June 1920), 3950; and Curston D.H. Goldin, "Causation of the War of
1812," Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 48
(April 1950), 107-20.
Another useful source in following the events preceding
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the war are biographies of the leading men of the period.
Perhaps the single most important figure in Kentucky in
this period was Henry Clay.

Although the biographies of

Clay are numerous, the best dealing with these years are
Bernard Mayo, Henry Clay:

Spokesman of the New West

(Cambridge, Mass., 1937). and Glyndon VanDeusen, The Life
of Henry Clay (Boston, 1937).

Of these two studies the

most valuable was Mayo, both because of his greater
thoroughness and his insight into conditions in Kentucky
during this period.
Another leading Kentucky "war hawk," Richard M.
Johnson. is studied in Leland Winfield Meyer, The Life and
Times of Colonel Richard (New York, 1932).

Meyer fails to

bring much insight into the conditions prior to the war in
Kentucky or into Johnson himself in this period.
Not everyone in Kentucky agreed with Clay and Johnson
on the desirability of war.

Matthew Lyon. in the House of

Representatives, was known to oppose war against England,
and John Pope, in the Senate, voted against the war
declaration in 1812.

Neither of these figures has been

the subject of an adequate biography although both have
been examined.

Tom W. Campbell. Two Fighters and Two

Fines; Sketches of the Lives of Matthew Lyon and Andrew
Jackson (Little Rock, 1941); James Fairfax McLaughlin.
Matthew Lyon, the Hampden of Congress. a Biography (New
York. 1900); Lyda Peek Smith, "Matthew Lyon in Kentucky."
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masters thesis, Western Kentucky University, 1932, have
all studied Lyon without revealing his motivation in
opposing war.

The same is true of Orval Walker Baylor,

John Pope, Kentuckian:

His Life and Times, 1770-1845

(Cynthiana, Kentucky, 1943); and Orval W. Baylor, "The Life
and Times of John Pope, 1770-1845," The Filson Club History
Quarterly, XV (April 1941), 59-77.

Baylor fails to deter-

mine how Pope could arrive at his decision to vote against
the war.
William Henry Harrison, the governor of the Indiana
territory was not a central figure in this study but a very
unusual biography presented for his 1840 presidential
campaign was examined in regard to Tippecanoe: anonymous,
The Life of Major General William Henry Harrison . .
(Philadelphia, 1840).
it is very interesting.

It is not an unbiased account, but
A more recent biography is Freeman

Cleaves, Old Tippecanoe; William Henry Harrison and His
Times (New York, 1939).
Just as with Pope and Lyon, no really outstanding
biography exists of Isaac Shelby.

The best examined for

this study was Mrs. W. E. Shirley, "Isaac Shelby; Pioneer,
Soldier, Statesman," Master's Thesis, Western Kentucky
University, 1934, but this study was far from adequate for
Shelby's role in the period before the war.
Finally, John Breckinridge, Senatorial leader and
Jefferson's Attorney General has been studied by Lowell H.
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Harrison, John Breckinridge; Jeffersonian Republican
Although Breckinridge died in 1806,

(Louisville, 1969).

he provides background to attitudes in Kentucky which
culminated in the outcry for war in 1812.
The Burr conspiracy was an important incident in
Kentucky during this period, and captured the attention of
Kentuckians.

The best study of this affair is Thomas

Perkins Abernethy, The Burr Conspiracy (New York, 1954).
Histories of Kentucky filled in many gaps in the
study, especially Robert McNutt McElroy, Kentucky In the
Nation's History (New York, 1909).

This study devoted

considerable time to the reaction in Kentucky to the events
leading to war.

Other useful histories were Thomas D.

Clark, A History of Kentucky (Lexington, 1960), and W. E.
Connelly and E. Merton Coulter, History of Kentucky
(Chicago, 1922), 5 vols.

Somewhat less useful were Mann

Butler, A History of the Commonwealth of Kentucky
(Louisville, 1824); Z. F. Smith, The History of Kentucky
(Louisville, 1895); and Lewis Collins, History of Kentucky
(Covington, 1847).

The latter was particularly

disappointing in its treatment of the period.
Kentuckians, however, in many cases were reacting to
diplomatic pressures.

These diplomatic incidents are

discussed in many works.

The best study dealing with the

impressment question is James Fulton Zimmerman, Impressment
of American Seamen (Port Washington, New York, 1966;
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originally published, 1925).

This study is still the only

work devoted to this question.

Non-importation is dis-

cussed by Herbert Heaton, "Non-Importation, 1806-1812,"
Journal of Economic History, I (Nov. 1941), 178-98.

The

Embargo of 1807 is best studied by L. M. Sears, Jefferson
and the Embargo (Durham, 1927).

Sears is very pro-Jefferson

and pro-embargo.
Pinckney's Treaty was very important to the West in
the early years of the nation.

It is best studied in

Samuel Flagg Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty:

America's Advantage

from Europe's Distress (New Haven, 1960; originally
published, 1926).

More general studies of value are

Charles C. Tansill, "Robert Smith," Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed.,
The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, (10
vols., New York, 1928), III; Marshall Smelser, The
Democratic Republic, 1801-1815 (New York, 1968); Albert H.
Carr. The Coming of War; An Account of the Remarkable
Events Leading to the War of 1812 (Garden City, 1960);
Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United
States (New York, 1965); Robert H. Ferrell, American
Diplomacy (New York, 1969); Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic
History of the American People (4th ed., New York, 1950).
These works were useful for filling in information.
The final event in the West which created unrest and
led to hostilities
west Territory.

was the Indian problems in the North-

There have been numerous secondary works
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devoted to this topic, however the most useful in this
study were:

E. Merton Coulter, "Prologue," to C. Glenn

Clift, Remember the Raisin!

Kentucky and Kentuckians in

the Battles and Massacre at Frenchtown Michigan Territory,
in the War of 1812 (Frankfort, 1961); Alec Richard Gilpin,
The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest (East Lansing, Mich.,
1958); Paul Francis Prucha, The Sword of the Republic; The
United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (New York,
1969); Ernest Alexander Cruishank, "The Employment of
Indians in the War of 1812," American Historical Association Annual Report for the year 1895 (Washington, 1895),
321-335.

Tippecanoe is studied in Benson J. Lossing, The

Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812 (New York, 1869);
Alfred Pirtle, The Battle of Tippecanoe (Louisville, 1900);
W. A. Wentworth, "Tippecanoe and Kentucky Too," The
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 60 (Jan.
1962), 36-44; Joe C. Creason, "The Battle of Tippecanoe,
November 7, 1811," The Filson Club History Quarterly, XXXVI
(Oct. 1962). 309-18.
The lands over which these conflicts took place can be
located in very good maps in Charles C. Royce, Indian Land
Cessions in the United States (Washington, 1900).

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I

Chart 1

MONTHLY INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF WESTERN
PRODUCTS AT NEW ORLEANS. 1804-1812a
(Monthly Average 1805-06 Equals 100)b

1804

1805

1806

1807

1808

1809

1810

1811

1812

Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.

84
85
83
82
82
86
86
89
89
90
91
92

92
99
101
98
103
103
102
108
103
103
103
105

103
104
98
96
93
92
91
92
96
101
106
106

104
101
100
95
90
90
92
94
93
93
93
90

90
86
79
80
78
78
75
77
80
78
84
86

86
81
79
83
85
83
82
83
84
87
88
90

89
88
87
89
86
82
87
87
87
91
91
89

91
89
80
79
76
74
73
72
77
78
83
76

73
80
75
74

Yearly
Av.

87

102

98

95

81

84

88

79

76c

aWeighted arithmetic mean of the relatives, the
relatives being weighted according to the value of the
product.
b In George Rogers Taylor, "Prices in the Mississippi
Valley Preceding the War of 1812," Journal of Economic and
Business History, III (Nov. 1930), 149.
cAverage for four months.
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Chart 2

MONTHLY INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF IMPORTED
GOODS AT NEW ORLEANS, 1805-1812a
(Average for 1805-06 Equals 100)b

1804

1805

1806

1807

1808

1809

1810

1811

1812
89
96

Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

100
100
100
101
100
100
102
102
103
104
104
104

101
101
98
99
98
99
98
98
98
97
97
97

98
99
96
97
95
94
92
93
93
92
92
92

91
91
91
91
90
90
91
91
91
92
93
93

97
101
101
102
103
103
102
102
101
103
102
99

100
101
101
102
96
99
102
101
100
96
94
93

92
91
90
90
90
88
88
88
88
88
89
88

Yearly
Av.

x

102

98

94

91

101

99

89

aWeighted arithmetic mean of the relatives, the
relatives being weighted according to the value of the
product.
b

In George Rogers Taylor, "Prices in the Mississippi
Valley Preceding the War of 1812." Journal of Economic and
Business History, III (Nov. 1930), 161.

